

**Race, Place and Crime through the Lens of Toronto's Print Media**

By

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**Abstract**

Geographical areas with high concentrations of impoverished racialized groups tend to experience disproportionate rates of violence in Canada. As news media heavily focuses on crime reports, violence often comes to characterize the affected neighbourhoods. News reports can impact audience levels of fear and scholars argue that disproportionate reporting of crime-related events can instil fear among the public. To date, there has been no study that examines a moral panic of neighbourhoods. Therefore, this thesis examines how the racialization of crime and the criminalization of place coalesce to create a moral panic of a neighbourhood. To examine the media's role in creating fear, two Toronto newspapers were sampled over a 14-year period. A frame analysis was conducted to investigate how Toronto newspapers framed Kingston-Galloway between 1998-2012. Findings suggest that Toronto newspapers racialize crime and criminalize place, which may aid in the construction of a moral panic of a neighbourhood.

*Keywords: Crime, frame analysis, moral panic, race, racialization*

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## Chapter 1: Introduction

In Canada, the research on the social ecology of lethal violence is limited, and only recently have Canadian scholars begun to examine violence at the neighbourhood level (see, Charron, 2009; Gartner & Thomson, 2004; Thompson, 2009; Thompson & Gartner, 2013). Findings from the American literature demonstrate that high levels of lethal violence are concentrated within inner city neighbourhoods that are often heavily racialized and characterized by high rates of poverty and income inequality (Blau & Blau, 1982; Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003; Sampson, 1985). While Canadian scholarship demonstrates that a small portion of lethal violence clusters in a small number of inner city neighbourhoods in Toronto, the majority of lethal violence is distributed in neighbourhoods outside the city centre, that is, within its “inner suburban” neighbourhoods (Thompson, 2009). Lethal violence is important to examine as news media focuses heavily on these events, and violence often characterizes affected neighbourhoods (Henry & Bjornson, 1999). These negative media portrayals can have significant implications for public perceptions of affected neighbourhoods, thus influencing the social services they receive and the manner in which they are policed.

In my current inquiry, I contend that media’s construction of place can have stigmatizing and long-lasting effects on Toronto’s inner suburban neighbourhoods. Because lethal violence is not equally distributed across the cityscape (Charron, 2009; Thompson, 2009), areas that experience increased levels of violent crime garner disproportionate media attention (Powell, 2012). As previously mentioned, these areas typically contain disproportionately large racialized populations. This is critical because previous Canadian research demonstrates that the media has a tendency to portray the

criminal activity of one racialized individual as characteristic of their entire racial group, while explaining White criminality as a product of individual pathology (Henry & Bjornson, 1999; Wortley, 2008). I maintain that the media's attribution of criminality to racial groups may extend further to the neighbourhoods in which they live. Therefore, this study seeks to expand the moral panic framework developed by Stanley Cohen (1972) to apply to geographic locations. To do so, I examine two local newspapers' role in creating fear of place, and resulting stigmatization of not only a specific neighbourhood, but also its residents.

The following section introduces Kingston-Galloway – the neighbourhood of focus for my inquiry. I then briefly discuss crime in Toronto and its impact on public policy. Subsequently, I discuss how together, the racialization of crime and the criminalization of place can oftentimes contribute to a moral panic relating to a geographic location. This chapter then introduces my research questions and how the current inquiry seeks to answer them. Finally, the chapter concludes with the outline for the remainder of my thesis.

### **Focus of Current Inquiry: Kingston-Galloway**

The present research focuses on the Kingston-Galloway neighbourhood, which is located east of Toronto's city centre. Kingston-Galloway is one of Toronto's designated 13 priority neighbourhoods<sup>1</sup> and has one of the largest concentrations of public housing

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<sup>1</sup> In 2005, the City of Toronto and the United Way identified 13 neighbourhoods in Toronto that lacked access to social services and facilities. The City of Toronto labeled these areas "priority neighbourhoods". However, as of 2013 the City of Toronto has re-examined the neighbourhoods that were previously identified for this program and have removed as well as added new neighbourhoods based on new criteria (Low, 2014, personal communication). Residents of the original neighbourhoods that were involved in this program stated that the label of a priority neighbourhood might in fact result in further stigmatization of the neighbourhood (Dale, *The Star*, August 16, 2013). Therefore, after 2013 in an effort to address residents' concerns about further stigmatization, the City of Toronto identifies these neighbourhoods as "Improvement Areas" (City of Toronto, 2014). As the focus of my thesis is on the construction of

in Canada (City of Toronto, 2006). Kingston-Galloway is also disproportionately comprised of low-income and racialized families, when compared to the average household income in the City of Toronto (City of Toronto, 2006; n.a., *The Star*, 2008, July 19, p. ID1). I argue that the negative media attention garnered by Kingston-Galloway ultimately results in its “territorial stigmatization” (Purdy, 2005) and more specifically, a reputation of being a geographical area that should be feared. This resulted, in part because Kingston-Galloway received increased media attention following the Toronto Police Services’ (TPS) gang raid, Project Pathfinder in 2004. The area is also the site of Toronto’s largest public mass shootings that occurred on Danzig Street in 2012<sup>2</sup>. Based largely on these events, the media has framed the neighbourhood within the context of gun and gang-related crimes. Indeed, media stories focus disproportionately on crimes within the neighbourhood, blaming residents for the neighbourhood’s problems, while neglecting to acknowledge systemic and structural disadvantages that plague the area.

### **Recent Crime in Toronto and its Impact on Public Policy**

Over the past fifteen years, Toronto has experienced a small number of serious gun-related crime incidents that have influenced public policy, thereby informing police actions. For example, several major gang initiatives or “sting” operations in the city drew substantial public and media attention, and have resulted in significant criminal justice policy changes. One high profile gang initiative took place in Kingston-Galloway

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Kingston-Galloway between 1998-2012 and my data analysis is limited to this period, I will continue to use the term priority neighbourhood in my examination of the media’s coverage of this area.

<sup>2</sup> A street party was held on July 16<sup>th</sup>, 2012 for residents on Danzig Street, located within Kingston-Galloway. Rival gang members arrived at the party and resulted in the worst mass shooting to occur in Toronto’s history. Two residents were murdered and 23 others injured as a result of the violence. (Dempsey, *Toronto Star*, 2012, July 18, p. A4).

following the murder of Breton Charlton and attempted murder of Leonard Bell on March 3, 2004. Charlton and Bell were shot in a case of mistaken identity by members of a street gang called the Galloway Boys who believed the two men were members of a rival street gang called the Malvern Crew, and were intruding on their “turf” (Powell, 2012). The murder and attempted murder of Charlton and Bell, respectively, resulted in the launch of Project Pathfinder, led by the Toronto Police Service. In October 2004, the TPS announced that arrests were made for “one murder and three attempted murders and a number of criminal-organization charges as a result of Project Pathfinder” (Toronto Police Service, Annual Report, 2005, p. 4). The Chief of Police, Bill Blair stated that Project Pathfinder was successful in dismantling the Galloway Boys and as such dramatically increased the overall public safety of Toronto neighbourhoods, thereby suggesting that the results of the raid would be long-lasting (Toronto Police Service, Annual Report, 2005, p. 4). Unfortunately, by December 2005, Toronto’s annual homicide rate reached 79 deaths, 52 of which were the result of incidence involving handguns (RCMP, 2006). Chief Blair’s statement has therefore been presumptuous. This is unsurprising given that research indicates that although police raids can result in modest short-term positive effects, the results are typically short-lived (Sherman & Eck, 2002).

As a result of the increased gun violence in 2005 and in an effort to address public concern over the rising gang and gun-related crimes in Toronto neighbourhoods, the Ontario government initiated a “tough on crime” approach, that since 2005, has witnessed \$73 million dollars of funding directed towards anti guns and gangs initiatives (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, 2013). To date, funding allocations

have supported the following such initiatives: Ontario Guns and Gangs Task Force; increased police presence in “high crime” neighbourhoods (in particular, Toronto Anti Violence Intervention Strategy – “TAVIS”), and the creation of major crime courts to deal with large scale gang investigations. Furthermore, these efforts have been supported by a tough on crime stance, which have included an increase in mandatory minimum sentences for both gun and drug-related offences by the federal Conservative government (Ministry of the Attorney General, 2006).

The Conservative government has taken a “tough-on-crime” approach to address certain criminal offences, and the province of Ontario has committed millions of dollars to fighting guns and gang. The City of Toronto however has adopted a different strategy by partnering with the United Way of Greater Toronto to address the effects of concentrated poverty. This partnership is based on an understanding that the suspected root causes of crime must be addressed before the City of Toronto will see a long-term reduction in violent and other forms of crime. Therefore, city staff developed the Strong Neighbourhood Task Force in April 2004, to identify and address the needs of Toronto’s most marginalized groups in its poorest neighbourhoods. The Strong Neighbourhood Task Force receives funding from both federal and provincial governments to help provide social services and improve infrastructure to under serviced neighbourhoods. As a result, in 2005, 13 neighbourhoods were identified as “priority neighbourhoods”. These neighbourhoods were lacking sufficient social services and infrastructure and were seen as not keeping pace with the growing needs and demographic composition of the community (Low, 2014, personal communication; United Way of Greater Toronto & City of Toronto, 2005). In addition to problems of crime and a lack of social services,

these neighbourhoods also house a disproportionate number of racialized residents (City of Toronto, 2006). In the following section I briefly examine how the concepts of race and racialization are understood in this study, and how they relate to media construction of place.

### **Racialization of Crime, Criminalization of Place and Moral Panic**

**Racialization of crime.** Race is commonly understood and discussed as an inherent biological trait, displayed in phenotypical characteristics such as skin colour and hair texture, that people or groups possess (Miles, 1989, as cited in Mirchandani & Chan, 2002). Many scholars however argue that race is a social construct, rather than a biological reality (Henry & Tator, 2009). Therefore, it has been suggested that race should be understood as a *process* rather than a static or fixed trait, which would then move the discussion of “race” towards “racialization” (Mirchandani & Chan, 2002, p. 12). The term racialization describes this process whereby traits, characteristics and attributes are ascribed to a particular group. These groups (typically non-Whites) are constructed and defined as fundamentally different, and usually inferior to Whites in a manner that maintains their social, political, and economic marginalization (Friedman, 1995, as cited in Mirchandani & Chan, 2002).

The criminalization of race and the racialization of crime can be viewed as part of this process, whereby the media (and other social actors) attribute criminal offending to the racial characteristics of a particular group (Jiwani, 2002). The association of Black communities, for example, with street crimes such as gun and gang violence has played an important role in the racialization of Blackness (Henry & Bjornson, 1999; Welch, 2007). The media facilitates the racialization of crime and the criminalization of place,

specifically of neighbourhoods that have a high non-White population. They construct this through the continued reporting of particular types of news stories and the manner in which they present these reports (Henry & Bjornson, 1999; Jiwani, 2002; Wortley, 2008). Furthermore, the sustained negative images of race act to reinforce the politics of power, by suggesting that certain groups are different (in the case of Black people, who are perceived as dangerous) and thus deserve to be controlled. This study examines whether the Toronto print media racializes crime in news stories about Kingston-Galloway, both with respect to its residents and its geographic composition.

**Criminalization of place.** One way that neighbourhoods can become stigmatized is the way in which they are represented in the media. Sean Purdy's (2003, 2005) analysis of the media's framing of Regent Park – Canada's oldest public housing neighbourhood – reveals the media's negative discourse surrounding the largely lone-parent, impoverished and highly racialized neighbourhood. Purdy (2003) argues that despite positive discourse around its initial construction, Regent Park is now referred to as a ghetto, a slum, and ultimately symbolically linked with socioeconomic deprivation and criminality, just 20 years after its creation. This argument is key as the construction of a geographic area as *bad* may not only garner increased media attention but also lead to increased police attention (Brunson & Miller, 2006). Although the media play a significant role in the racialization of crime, they also aid in the creation of outcast places, which are typically over policed and criminalized due to the residents' perceived propensity for criminality (Purdy, 2003). Such constructs may lead to increased levels of fear of these neighbourhoods among members of the public.

**Moral panic.** Together, the racialization of crime and the criminalization of place can result in a moral panic. Cohen (1972) defines a moral panic as “A condition, episode, person or groups of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests” (p. 9). According to Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009), the media presents perceived threats to society in the form of exaggerated stories and/or distorted statistical portrayals. These misrepresentations often result in the stereotypical portrayal of groups and create a panic among the public towards the perceived threat. Fear constructed by the media can also persuade the government to introduce new or amend existing policies around certain issues. Crime reports that are covered by news media are oftentimes racialized, and according to moral panic theorists exaggerated and/or fabricated (Cohen, 1972; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009). Constant negative and exaggerated media accounts of certain events, such as street gang activity, gun offences and drug trafficking tend to evoke a sense of fear among the general public and garner the attention of government officials. This then makes it easier for the government to argue that policy and legislative amendments that support their crime agenda are justified. Ultimately, Cohen (1972) argues that moral panics are cyclical, ebbing and flowing with shifting societal values. Moral panic theory and the social construction of fear of place serve as the theoretical foundation for my study, as the fear that can arise from media reports is often detrimental to specific social groups who reside within a specific geographical territory.

### **My Current Study**

My thesis examines the Toronto print media’s role in maintaining a negative image of place by focusing on news reporting about the Kingston-Galloway

neighbourhood. Moreover, I examine the construction of place from a macro-structural approach. As such, I focus not only on race and crime, but also examine how socioeconomic status within Toronto, Canada may be helpful in understanding why negative images of place are maintained while positive images are ignored in the context of inner suburban neighbourhoods. In examining the above-mentioned issues, my study seeks to explore the following questions:

1. How has the Toronto print media (specifically, the *Toronto Star* and *Toronto Sun*) framed Kingston-Galloway and its residents between 1998-2012?
2. Has the Toronto print media privileged portrayals of crime and violence over other, more positive portrayals of the neighbourhood?
3. Have the portrayals of Kingston-Galloway in Toronto's print media resulted in the negative and stereotypical depiction of Black communities in an inner suburban neighbourhood?
4. Has the Toronto print media helped in the production of the racialization of crime and criminalization of place in a manner that creates a moral panic resulting in fear of a neighbourhood?

### **Organization of the Study**

To address the aforementioned questions, the subsequent chapters will proceed as follows. Chapter Two contextualizes the topic through a review of the literature that examines the racialization of crime and how media aids in this process. I then examine the literature on space and its context for place as well as how neighbourhoods are defined. The chapter is divided into two sections; the racialization of crime and the criminalization of place constitutes the first section. The second is an exploration of how

crime and criminalization of place coalesce to create a moral panic around particular neighbourhoods. The chapter concludes with Kingston-Galloway's demographic composition to contextualize why I have chosen this neighbourhood as the focus of my inquiry. As other studies have shown, certain demographics have been found to be associated with increased levels of crime (Blau & Blau, 1982; Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003; Sampson, 1985). Therefore, Kingston-Galloway's demographic information provides a foundation for understanding the complexities of neighbourhood levels of crime and media imagery.

Chapter Three presents the theoretical framework of moral panic that I utilize throughout my thesis. I begin by describing Cohen's (1972) original moral panic framework, recent amendments to his work, which includes critiques of his original theory. Since the construction of place is outside the scope of this paradigm, I offer a revised moral panic framework to account for a wider application of Cohen's original work.

The final three chapters relate to my current study. Chapter Four delineates the methods used, which involve a qualitative approach. My approach uses a thematic analysis to account for the frequency and types of news reports that I examined. I then use this analysis to explore how news reports have framed Kingston-Galloway specifically. In Chapter Five, I present my results and findings. The final chapter identifies the limitations of this work, future research recommendations, and concludes with policy implications based on my findings.

## **Chapter 2: Literature Review**

I contend that the media play an instrumental role in the racialization of crime and criminalization of place, which can result in media outlets creating an overall fear of inner suburban neighbourhoods. This chapter is organized into three separate components. The first section examines the racialization of crime created by the media; the second section explores how the media criminalize place; and the final section presents a brief description Kingston-Galloway's socioeconomic composition. Prior to exploring racialization of crime, the following section begins with a discussion of race more broadly.

### **Racialization of Crime**

I begin this section by first exploring the concept of race. To understand racialization, it is imperative to understand race and how it has, conceptually, evolved over time. Therefore, I provide a brief discussion of the historical context of race and then move towards the current understanding of race.

#### **Race and Racialization**

To understand the racialization of crime, we need to explore how race is perceived, and ultimately used to establish and reinforce power relations between groups in society. Race can be defined as: "a symbolic category, based on phenotype or ancestry and constructed and according to specific social and historical contexts, that is misrecognized as a natural category" (Desmond & Emirbayer, 2009, p. 336). Desmond and Emirbayer's definition takes into account the fact that the concept of race has been created by humans and is not based in any biological foundation. Instead, categorizing people into different groups creates the misconception that there are real and inherent

differences between groups of people that lie within phenotypical variation. The creation of groups, that is racial differences, has involved systematically establishing these differences within a hierarchical system. These racial hierarchies have historically placed Whites at the top, implying superiority, while placing Black people and other groups at the bottom (Khenti, 1996; Mirchandani & Chan, 2002). This hierarchy is necessary to justify the enslavement of Black people and the appropriation of Aboriginal lands (Henry & Tator, 2009). Although Black and Aboriginal peoples are no longer explicitly portrayed in the same way that they have been historically, perceived differences between racial groups remain (Henry & Tator, 2009). As I have suggested above, the ongoing process of racialization is facilitated in part by media portrayals of different “racial” groups. It is also ever evolving.

In spite of its nature as a malleable social construct, much of the previous Canadian criminological literature has not framed race in these terms, instead treating it as a discreet variable that can be manipulated in statistical analysis (Mirchandani & Chan, 2002, p. 9). Positioning race in this manner removes race from the evolving social contexts in which it obtains its label, meaning and power or depending on the race - lack of power (Holdaway, 1997). As race is socially constructed and receives its meaning from social contexts and social institutions, it requires examination with an understanding of other factors (i.e., media, government, policies). Therefore, in order to capture the social, political and economic forces that impact power relations between different groups as propagated through news media, my study focuses on the processes of racialization rather than on the concept of race alone.

**Racialization.** In Canada, the term race has rarely been defined within criminology, although when it is, race is discussed as an inherent trait that people and groups possess – removed from any social context (Mirchandani & Chan, 2002). As stated in the section above, a weakness of analyzing race as an isolated or discrete variable is that one cannot examine the social processes involved in the production of racial categories. This is in part due to shifting views of social institutions that reinforce the positioning of social others, as race is geographically and temporally specific. As such, many scholars argue that race should not – and cannot – be removed from its social context and therefore should be understood as a process and not in isolation of its context (Desmond & Emirbayer, 2009; Holdaway, 1997; Mirchandani & Chan, 2002). The discussion then should focus on racialization.

Racialization accounts for the social, political and economic spheres that play a significant role in the production of race within a specified time and place. More specifically, racialization can be defined as:

- (1) The process by which race is attributed to particular social practices and discourses in which way that they are given special significance and are embedded within a set of additional meanings (e.g., the racialization of crime).
- (2) A process by which ethno-racial groups are categorized, stigmatized, inferiorized, and marginalized as the ‘others’ (Henry & Tator, 2009, p. 383).

The process of othering involves creating an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy within popular discourse (i.e., news media, social media, politics). The ‘us’ is the insider group whereas the ‘other’ is an outsider, bad, criminal, inherently different and largely a group to be feared. Labelling a group as an other casts them as a social outsider, as different and often as a threat to the dominant group (Henry & Tator, 2009). In doing so (in the case of

race), it promotes broader social, political and economic strategies used to maintain White hegemony (Henry & Tator, 2009; Mirchandani & Chan, 2002, pp. 14-15).

One of the dominant social forces that reinforces between group differences is the media. As the majority of Canadians obtain their information about the world through news media (Dowler, Flemming & Muzzatti, 2006; Henry & Bjornson, 1999; Wortley, 2008) it is not surprising that news media has a strong impact on how the public acquires their beliefs and opinions about the world and groups of people within it (Henry & Bjornson, 1999). The following section reviews the literature on how the media has created a link between race and crime, otherwise known as the ‘racialization of crime’.

### **Race, Crime and the Media**

As media is the primary source for transmitting information to the public, how they construct and report stories can profoundly impact and shape the public’s attitude towards various issues, in particular developing a nexus between race and crime (Dowler, 2003; Dowler, Flemming & Muzzatti, 2006; Henry & Bjornson, 1999; Weitzer & Kubrin, 2004; Wortley, 2008). The media does not simply report the news; they construct and frame an issue in a manner that is consistent with their political leanings and the positions of those who own media outlets (Bjornstrom, Kaufman, Peterson & Slater, 2010; Schissel, 1997). This type of framing can impact audience perceptions of issues and strengthen a government’s crime and criminal justice agendas.

A growing body of literature is focused on how media and crime, in particular the relationship of race and crime, is framed within the media (see, Dixon & Linz, 2000a; Dixon & Linz, 2000b; Chirricos & Eschholz, 2002). This research has typically been conducted in the United States, however several Canadian studies do exist (see, Collins,

2014; Henry & Bjornson, 1999; Wortley, 2008). Accordingly, this section will largely present American literature and then conclude with a narrowed focus on Canadian research.

**Constructing the nexus of race and crime.** Research findings relating to media representations of race and crime are mixed. Some studies have found that racialized groups are overrepresented as perpetrators of crime (Dixon & Linz, 2000a). Other findings suggest that Black people are in fact represented in news coverage at a rate that is proportionate to their arrest rates (Chiricos & Eschholz, 2002). And Dixon, Azocar and Casas (2003) found that White people, not Black people were overrepresented as perpetrators of crime in crime media.

Previous findings have been influenced by various characteristics of the study. For example, whether the study was qualitative or quantitative in nature, or whether the focus was on local versus national news. Bjornstrom et al. (2010) examined various aspects of news coverage, including the race of individuals who choose the stories that were reported, and which aspects of crime were deemed newsworthy. They found that the “social structural context of the market area of the broadcast (population composition, and for victims’ race or ethnicity, the level of violence in the area) are contributors to television news reporting of perpetrators’ and victims’ race or ethnicity” (p. 287). Controlling for all the characteristics that provided context for crime reporting, Black people were still generally overrepresented in crime reports.

Other research findings suggest that Black people were not overrepresented in crime reports (Dixon & Linz, 2000a; Dixon & Linz, 2000b; Chiricos & Eschholz, 2002). Dixon & Linz (2000a) conducted a content analysis of television reporting on Los

Angeles' media's reporting of crime victimization. The authors found that Whites were overrepresented as victims of crime, while African Americans and Latinos were underrepresented. Conversely, African Americans were overrepresented as perpetrators of crime. These findings were consistent with Dixon and Linz's (2000b) study that also found that African Americans were overrepresented as lawbreakers, compared to Whites who were overrepresented as law defenders (i.e., police officers).

These findings are surprising as homicide research reveals that Black people are overrepresented as both victims and perpetrators of violent crime (Gartner & Thompson, 2004). The media however report disproportionate involvement of Black perpetrators of crime, and disproportionately report Whites as victims of crime (Dixon & Linz, 2000a). As violent crime is typically intraracial, Black people should also occupy a higher percentage of media stories that report on Black victims of crime. This is not the case however. This type of reporting is important in the production and maintenance of a euphemistic link between criminality and Black maleness (Welch, 2007). The persistent illustration of Black people as suspects and perpetrators of crime plays an important role in the media's racialization of crime.

Chiricos and Escholz (2002) conducted a quantitative and qualitative analysis of Florida television news reports and analyzed how people of different racial backgrounds were portrayed in local news stories. Their quantitative findings revealed that African Americans were not overrepresented as suspects of crime in relation to their proportion of the population, but in fact were underrepresented, based on available arrest data. Alternatively, White people were overrepresented as crime suspects when compared to their arrest rates (Chiricos & Eschholz, 2002, p. 415). The qualitative analysis however

revealed a different picture. The language that was used to describe Black suspects was more ‘threatening’ compared to White suspects. That is, Black perpetrators of crime were described in a manner that demonized them, which was then attributed to the entire racial group (Larson, 2006). Their qualitative results were consistent with Entman’s (1992) Chicago study that revealed Black people were overrepresented in crime reports, and notably, received harsher descriptions within the reports.

### **Media Portrayal of Racialized Victims**

Previous studies reveal that there are inconsistent findings to support the assertion that Black people are overrepresented in all media reporting of crime (Chiricos & Eschholz, 2002). It has been found that when Black people are featured in crime stories, it is generally as the perpetrators of violent offences (Chiricos & Eschholz, 2002; Dixon & Linz, 2000b). Furthermore, as homicide is largely intraracial, Black people should also be over-represented as the victims of violent crime given that they are over-represented as perpetrators.

Dixon and Linz (2000a) analyzed how Los Angeles’ news media reported the perpetrators and victims of crime. Their findings demonstrated that White people were over-represented as victims of homicide, while Black people were represented at a rate that was proportionate to their representation in local crime reports – they were neither over nor under-represented. However, while media reports of Black victimization were represented in proportion to crime reports, their portrayal as suspects and perpetrators were not. These findings support Welch’s (2007) argument that Black people were demonized through constant negative portrayals in crime stories. This imagery helps to associate Black communities with an increased proclivity towards crime. In another

study, Bjornstrom et al. (2010) found that African Americans and Latinos were less likely to be shown as victims of crime in comparison to Whites. The authors suggested that White privilege favoured media reporting of White victims, which they argued was in part a product of White ownership of news media. The overarching rationale for the lack of minority victim reporting was attributed to those in power in media corporations who construct and maintain the image of Black people as criminals. This in turn reinforces the discriminatory and exclusionary criminal justice policies as a method of social control for 'undesirable' populations.

The aforementioned scholarship suggests that there are inconsistencies within the literature, which can be attributed to the various methods of analyses used to explore race and crime in news reporting (i.e., quantitative and qualitative). Second, research has analyzed print and television news formats, which yield different findings. And third, scholars have examined local and national news coverage, which can be problematic as local news findings may not be generalizable, thus resulting in variances among research findings.

The following section examines literature on Canadian media's portrayal of race and crime to examine differences and/or similarities to American findings. As the Canadian literature is less developed, I am unable to examine media portrayals of suspects and victims. Instead, I am only able to focus on general media depictions of racialized groups.

### **Media, Race and Crime: A Canadian Perspective**

To date, there have only been three studies that have attempted to address the question of how racialization of crime is constructed in Canadian news reports, two of

which focused solely on Toronto, Canada (see Collins, 2014; Henry & Bjornson, 1999; Wortley, 2008). Each are discussed below.

Henry and Bjornson (1999) analyzed articles from the *Toronto Star* and the *Toronto Sun* between the years 1994-1997 and they employed discourse analysis and content analysis to examine how Jamaicans and Vietnamese people were portrayed in the media. The study consisted of two components, the first investigating all news articles between 1994 – 1997 that mentioned the term “Jamaicans” and any article that mentioned the term “Vietnamese” in the years 1994 and 1997. The second study examined a sample that was collected in order to consider *all* crime related reports obtained from the *Toronto Star* and the *Toronto Sun* over randomly selected years between 1994-1997. The first part of their analysis related to the construction of Jamaicans resulted in 10 themes ranging from sports through crime/justice. Findings indicated that over 60% of all news articles containing Jamaicans discussed them in the context of sports, entertainment and crime/justice.

Overall, their findings presented a narrow focus of racialized groups in the media, with particular emphasis on stereotypical portrayals relating to sports or crime. The authors noted that the media, in their reporting of violent crime, tended to generalize the actions of an individual Black person to the entire racialized group. Alternatively, when a White person engaged in violent criminality, the offence was individualized. In other words, the person was regarded as having an individual pathology, something that is not applied to the entire group (Henry & Bjornson, 1999, p. 125). This type of imagery, they argued, was necessary for the maintenance of White hegemony, and was supported through the constant negative portrayals of racialized groups (pp. 135-136).

In addition to Henry and Bjornson's (1999) seminal work, Wortley (2008) presented findings from a content analysis of the same Toronto newspapers, the *Toronto Star* and the *Toronto Sun*, to examine how the media represented racialized groups in Toronto. His results were consistent with Henry and Bjornson's (1999) findings. Wortley (2008) suggested that Black communities were overrepresented in crime and sports/entertainment reports, which reinforced the stereotypical imagery that Black people are good athletes (p. 108). Furthermore, according to Wortley's analysis, Black people generally occupied a limited number of social roles within the media. When images of Black people were presented, they accounted for 22% of *all* criminal offenders, however they only comprised 8% of Toronto's population. Arguably, the stereotypical and negative image of Black communities in popular media is utilized to maintain their exclusion from social, political and economic arenas (Wortley, 2008, p. 126).

Extending Henry and Bjornson (1999) and Wortley's (2008) work, Collins (2014) conducted a content analysis of four local newspapers<sup>3</sup> across Canada covering a 30-year period to examine whether there was racial bias in the descriptions of offenders and victims (p. 78). Her findings indicated that articles discussing *offenders* portrayed racialized people as poor, uneducated criminals. The findings for White offenders by contrast, reflected Henry and Bjornson (1999) and Wortley's (2008) findings, which illustrated that White criminality was portrayed as a product of individual pathology. When articles discussed *victims*, racialized victims were linked to gang violence (even in the absence of evidence of gang involvement). Conversely, the language used to describe White victims tended to suggest that victimization could happen to anyone.

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<sup>3</sup> In this study, the *Vancouver Sun*, *Saskatoon Star Phoenix*, *Winnipeg Free Press* and the *Toronto Star* were analyzed.

Collins' (2014) study added to the previous Canadian literature in three important ways. First, the focus was specifically on race and crime portrayed in print media. Second, the manner in which the racial characteristics of the offenders and victims of crime were described in the reports was analyzed. And third, her work examined four local newspapers across Canada to gain a broader perspective of whether racial portrayals of crime varied across the country.

Nevertheless, the three Canadian studies yielded similar results – Canadian newspapers generally portrayed Black people as having an increased propensity for criminal involvement compared to Whites. These findings have implications for audience perceptions of crime and accordingly, can impact individual levels of fear of crime. The following section examines the scholarship on fear of crime.

### **Media and Audience Effects of Fear of Crime**

Previous studies have indicated that the media tend to racialize specific types of crime, for example, street level crimes engaged in by Black people. The consistent portrayal of Black people as both suspects and perpetrators of crime has an impact on audience perceptions. First, it encourages the belief that Black communities are disproportionately engaged in criminal activities, and typically engage in violent street crimes, which is explained in part by their perceived culture of violence (see, Anderson, 1999). Second, audience levels of fear of crime have increased (see, Callanan, 2012; Weitzer & Kubrin, 2004). Although my study does not measure audience levels of fear of crime, it is important to examine how media reports can impact levels of fear of crime.

The extant literature on audience perceptions of crime reports and fear of crime has predominantly been conducted in the United States, with one notable exception in

Canada (Doob & Macdonald, 1979). Scholars have examined audience levels of fear of crime from various perspectives. For example, some scholars examined whether the type of news media the public consumed impacted levels of fear (see Weitzer & Kubrin, 2004; Chricos et al., 1997), while others examined racial and ethnic differences in audience levels of fear of crime (see Callanan, 2012; Eschholz, 2002). Although there were some consistencies among the findings, there have also been some discrepancies based on the medium consumed (i.e., local/national newspapers, local/national television news, radio and the Internet) and the effect each has on an individual's level of fear. The subsequent section will examine literature on fear of crime generally, and then focus on literature that addresses fear of crime and fear of specific neighbourhoods.

**Media and fear of crime.** Generally, scholarship on fear of crime consistently suggests that news reports and crime media (e.g., television crime shows) have an impact on audience levels regarding fear of crime. To assess levels of fear among audience members, the majority of studies relied on self-report surveys.

Chricos, Eschholz and Gertz (1997) conducted a survey of approximately 2000 Florida residents during a period of increased crime reporting in the media. After controlling for age, gender, race and victimization, the volume of television and radio news consumed was significantly related to levels of fear of crime. Their study builds upon previous research that examined one source of crime media (Heath, 1984; Doob & MacDonald, 1979). Chricos et al.'s (1997) findings illustrated that women and Black people were generally more fearful than men and White people, respectively. Moreover, those who watched television or listened to radio crime reports, self-reported increased levels of fear. Conversely, reading newspapers had no apparent impact on fear of crime

(Chiricos et al., 1997, p. 348). This finding was partially consistent with Callanan's (2012) finding that when data was disaggregated, newspapers increased levels of fear among White readers. The author noted that people with higher levels of education had better memories of newspaper accounts than those with lower levels of education and retained information for lengthier periods than those who watched television news. Accordingly, depending on the audience and level of education, the medium that impacts levels of fear varies between races and socioeconomic statuses.

Weitzer and Kubrin (2004) examined the role media had on levels of fear of crime across various news mediums (i.e., television, radio, newspapers and the Internet), covering both local and national crime reports. Their findings suggested that Black people were more fearful of crime than White people. Individual levels of fear of crime however could be influenced by various factors including previous victimization, neighbourhood levels of crime, as well as the type and frequency of media coverage of crime. Radio, newspapers and Internet news were negatively associated with levels of fear of crime, however White people cited their main source of news from newspapers. This finding is similar to Callanan's (2012) results; however she noted White people's level of fear of crime increased as a result of reading newspapers.

In contrast to Weitzer and Kubrin's (2004) study, Heath (1984) conducted a telephone survey to investigate newspaper crime reports and audience levels of fear of crime. Although the analysis focused solely on newspapers, Heath found that the type of stories that were reported directly influenced audiences' feelings of fear. Similarly, Liska and Baccaglioni's (1990) results suggested that newspaper crime reports had the strongest affect on audiences who were less likely to experience victimization (e.g., Whites). The

authors conducted a content analysis of local news reports and found that local homicide reports may influence levels of fear. Alternatively, homicide reports had the weakest impact on levels of fear for people who typically experienced increased levels of victimization, that is, young Black males.

It is evident that the results of audience levels of fear of crime vary depending on the race of the audience, socioeconomic status as well as the neighbourhood in which the individual resides. The following section examines the literature on levels of fear of crime and neighbourhoods.

**Media, fear of crime and neighbourhoods.** Gilliam, Valentino and Beckmann (2002) examined the impact of racial segregation and local television news consumption on attitudes towards Black people. The authors hypothesized that a lack of real life experiences with Black people in racially homogenous neighbourhoods may indicate that people were more likely to be influenced by media accounts (p. 756). Participants were provided either a full script of the news report (involving Black suspects), or a script that had missing information (involving White suspects) (p. 757). Findings suggested that when subjects were given the full script, White subjects residing in an overwhelmingly White neighbourhood had more negative feelings towards Black people. In fact, they even endorsed tougher crime policies (Gilliam et al., 2002, p. 757). White people from mixed neighbourhoods however were not affected by the full script and were less accepting of the negative stereotypes of African Americans.

These results suggest that when lacking direct experience with a group, one's perceptions are more likely to be impacted by media accounts (Chiricos et al., 1997). Stated differently, "Interracial proximity... allows Whites to counteract negative media

messages about African-Americans” (Gilliam et al., 2002, p. 774). Therefore, when White people do not interact with African Americans, or reside in mixed neighbourhoods, the media can profoundly shape perceptions of groups, and subsequently predominantly Black neighbourhoods.

Heath’s (1984) findings also suggested that reports of crime in other areas, outside of one’s own neighbourhood, in fact helped the reader to feel more secure. Heath argued that local crime news had the greatest impact on fear of crime and these findings were consistent with increasing levels of fear when reports of violence occurred in an individual’s neighbourhood.

A different approach was taken to examine media effects of fear of crime by Waymer (2009) in his auto ethnographic study. Waymer (2009) was interested in understanding the impact crime coverage could have on Black males who lived outside of high crime neighbourhoods. Prior to travelling to an inner city neighbourhood in Cincinnati, Waymer read nine years of newspaper crime reports related to the area. He noted that prior to travelling to the neighbourhood he was not fearful, however after reading crime reports he noted that his fear of the neighbourhood increased. The author cited media crime reports for his shift in perception and increased levels of fear. His study highlighted that media can have a direct impact on an outsider’s level of fear of perceived high crime neighbourhoods.

It is evident that media plays a role in affecting levels of fear among its audience, although it is dependent on the medium consumed, the audience member and the neighbourhood in which they reside. The following section examines the media’s role in criminalizing place.

### **Criminalization of Place**

Research findings indicate that fear of crime can generalize to fear of a location when local news reports focus on stories that emphasize crime in a particular area (Heath, 1984; Waymer, 2009). Fear of crime can have negative consequences for stigmatized neighbourhoods and its residents, which can include inadequate funding for social services, excessively harsh policing measures and a general avoidance of the area by non-residents (Weitzer, 2010). The second part of this chapter examines how places become constructed as an outcast place and the roles the media and government play in criminalizing particular neighbourhoods. The following section provides an understanding of neighbourhoods. I first begin by providing an explanation of space and place prior to examining the media's role in the construction of place.

Chicago School sociologists Shaw and McKay (1942) were among the first to examine crime within the context of the changing social ecology of Chicago. Their study provided a platform for other researchers to move away from individualistic explanations of criminal behaviour towards specific ecological explanations of criminality, particularly economic deprivation, socio-economic conditions, neighbourhood isolation and unequal access to social services (see Blau & Blau, 1982, Charron, 2009; Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003; Sampson, 1985; Thompson, 2009; Thompson & Gartner, 2013). Since their pioneering work, there has been an extensive body of literature on crime, Black communities and neighbourhood levels of violence (i.e., the spatial distribution of crime), specifically in the United States. Due to restricted access to geocoded crime data that includes victim/offender information, the Canadian literature on the social ecology of crime is by comparison limited.

To begin to understand and address issues of the spatial distribution of crime, a differentiation between space and place is necessary in order to help contextualize how neighbourhoods have come into existence and how the identity of a place is formed. As such, the following section reviews the literature on space and place.

### **Understanding Space and Place**

Humanist geographers have written extensively on space, the construction of place and the implications it has on the establishment of exclusionary places (Cresswell, 1996, 2009; Sibley, 1995). Because the focus of this thesis is criminological in nature, the following discussion of space and place is limited.<sup>4</sup> The emphasis will be on place, or more specifically, neighbourhoods, however, a discussion of place would be incomplete without first understanding the concept of space.

**Defining space.** The foundational work of Tuan (1977) examined space and place from a phenomenological perspective. He asserted that “space [is] that which allows movement, then place is pause; each pause in movement makes it possible for location to be transformed into place” (Tuan, 1976, p. 6). Space then, is abstract, free and open, whereas place requires stillness, a sense of belonging and attachment. When space is experienced, it is typically associated with place. Therefore, it can be understood that space contributes to the understanding of places, although space obtains its overall meaning from places (Relph, 1976, p.8).

Furthermore, space is open and has been untouched by humans – it has no meaning until humans affix meaning and experiences to it. Indeed, space is an important resource that can confer “wealth and power when properly exploited. It is a worldwide

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<sup>4</sup> For a detailed discussion of space and place see, Cresswell, 1996, 2004, 2009; Relph, 1976; Sack, 1980; Sibley, 1995; Tuan, 1977.

symbol of prestige” (Tuan, 1976, p. 58). It is beyond the scope of my thesis to examine the political influences that affect the distribution of land to create and maintain social exclusion of certain groups in society. It is important however to understand that power is affixed to certain neighbourhoods (see, Sibley, 1995). The collective meaning of existential space (i.e., lived space) relies on the meaning affixed to it by cultural groups, not by each individual (Relph, 1976, p. 12). Space can be culturally meaningful to a group, although it varies across cultures (Relph, 1976, pp. 12-15). Once geographical space is claimed, named and experienced, it then becomes place – something that provides meaning and holds value for individuals (Cresswell, 1996, 2009; Relph, 1976; Sibley, 1995; Tuan, 1977).

**Defining place.** Space becomes place through human experience and affixing a label or meaning to the once untouched space (Relph, 1976). Place is not merely a geographical location, it is an encompassing sense of meaning for individuals, that is it involves emotions and feelings (Cresswell, 2009, p. 196). Similar to race, place is socially constructed and any meaning that is given to space is fluid – it can change due to historical, political and social forces (Cresswell, 1996). In this way, places actively reinforce current social norms (Cresswell, 1996, p. 16).

Place is not open and boundary free; it is defined and bounded by human experience. To understand the sense of ‘inside’ place is to understand that it is not simply a geographical boundary. It is defined by what is ‘inside’ as much as what is ‘outside’ of place (Cresswell, 2009). Sibley (1995) states “The human landscape can be read as a landscape of exclusion” (p. ix). That is, place is used to support and manipulate “ideological and political arguments” (Cresswell, 1996, p. 8). Political actors use place

as a means of social exclusion and to socially control certain groups in society. “[P]ower is expressed in the monopolization of space and the relegation of weaker groups in society to less desirable environments” (Sibley, 1995, p. ix).

Understanding place means that people (i.e., insiders) have experiences in a place that give it meaning, thus creating boundaries. Boundaries lead to feelings of being inside/outside of place and therefore help in the creation of insiders and outsiders. The manner in which in/out of place experiences are created is through an understanding of meaning and as Cresswell (1996) argued, through transgressions. Certain places require a particular behaviour to be followed and when it is not, boundaries are perceived to be crossed. He further maintained that it is this very type of accepted behaviour in a particular place that when disturbed is deemed out of place. For example, the social norm of observing silence in a library, however when this behaviour is not followed it is deemed out of place (Cresswell, 1996, p. 16).

A more political example would be Dundas Square in Toronto, Canada. Prior to 2003, it was a site for commercial activity, which included the Eaton Centre and other shops in close proximity, but it was also a social hangout for Black youth. Police perceived these youth to be a source of trouble and a cause of crime in the area (Teelucksingh, 2006, p. 2). Since 2003, the area has restricted access, limiting loitering, skateboarding and increasing lease rates. These actions serve as a method by which to privatize a public place. Moreover, Dundas Square is now used by racialized groups to claim back the space. In particular, Black communities who were once seen as the problem in the area are now utilizing the space for events such as the Caribana parade. Thus demonstrating that racialized people are the “*right people* when diversity, culture,

and commerce are linked together” (Teelucksing, 2006, p. 3, emphasis in original). This example demonstrates that place is routinely used for political and commercial gains. Black communities who were once deemed “out of place” in Dundas Square are “in place” when the City of Toronto is presented as a diverse and multicultural city.

Conversely, place can be used to reinforce the notion that certain people are insiders, while other groups are outsiders. Marginalized groups are positioned as outsiders and are the recipients of less desirable landscapes (Sibley, 1995). Through the processes of racialization, these groups have already been stigmatized and government agencies use stereotypes as reinforcing behaviour deemed in and out of place. For example, gun crimes are typically unusual in affluent neighbourhoods, while almost accepted as normative behaviour in impoverished areas, citing cultural predispositions to violence (Teelucksingh, 2006, p. 3). This imagery is reinforced through media representations of neighbourhoods, which is then used as examples as to why the public should support the government’s position for social control of a group and increased policing of a geographic location.

Social divisions are prominent in landscapes (e.g., affluence or poverty). Landscapes can be used as a “medium of communication” (Cresswell, 1996, p. 34), in which all elements directly or indirectly send messages to the public at large – buildings, streets, parades etc. all serve to make neighbourhoods distinct. In particular, the image of concentrated high-rise apartments in an inner suburban neighbourhood, compared to concentrated high rise condominiums in downtown Toronto send different visual messages about the neighbourhood. One signals poverty while the other suggests affluence. Insiders and outsiders both construct neighbourhood imagery, however

outsiders typically rely on media images in constructing their ideas of places. The reliance on media constructs of place is problematic, as persistent negative depictions of place may result in further stigmatization of people and places (Purdy, 2003). The media also associates race and place, which can create exclusionary landscapes (Sibley, 1995). The following section examines race and place and how the two have become interrelated.

### **Race, Place and Policies**

It is evident that place holds power and certain groups are created as others, or outsiders within specific places (Cresswell, 1996). Place is fluid, as evidenced by gentrification. When a neighbourhood is gentrified, or becomes known as an ‘ethnic enclave,’ such as Chinatown or Little Italy, they are typically viewed by the city as being multicultural as they increase tourism, which equates to profit. Inner suburban neighbourhoods however do not attract the same attention. This can be interpreted as Canadians endorsing multiculturalism while also holding different perspectives of what diversity looks like (Teelucksingh, 2006, p. 6). “Conceptually, black [sic] spaces are often included as part of the ‘black [sic] problem’, and linked to the socioeconomic difficulties of the black [sic] under class” (Teelucksingh, 2006, p. 7).

Social and political policies have profound negative effects on certain racial groups in society and especially on residential housing patterns in Canada (Bauder & Sharpe, 2002; Purdy, 2003). Policies are not solely ideological in nature; rather, they can have real life consequences for residents in creating concentrated poverty in specific neighbourhoods. As policies are entrenched in law, it establishes a legal means for those in power to maintain control, typically White upper class individuals, while at the same

time suppressing racialized minorities, specifically Black communities. However, it is the suppression of not just any Black communities, but those in a position of extreme disadvantage and poverty (De Coster et al., 2006). Black communities typically populate both inner-city and inner suburban neighbourhoods and experience social, economic and political isolation, essentially perpetuating cultural subordination (De Coster et al., 2006).

In 1949, the federal government introduced public housing in Toronto (Skelton, 1996). Public housing was originally created in the post World War II era to address housing shortages, especially for veteran groups (Purdy, 2003). The intended recipients of public housing were veterans, seniors and two parent families, which is different from the current demographic composition of these neighbourhoods today. In 1964, the *National Housing Act* allowed provincial and municipal governments to use federal funds to develop public housing units rather than public housing being entirely planned by the federal government (Skelton, 1996). These housing units were initially intended to house native-born, two parent families. Purdy (2003) noted that public housing, specifically Regent Park (Canada's oldest public housing units), became known as a 'slum' due to the negative media and government portrayals of the area. He attributed the negative discourse to the concentration of lone-parent, low-income racialized groups residing in the housing units. By the 1970s, public housing units gained a negative reputation due to the poor planning involved, the poor quality of life for residents and the "ghettoization of low-income persons" (Skelton, 1996, p. 193). During the 1980s the building of public housing ceased and third sector developers began constructing social housing (Purdy, 2003; Skelton, 1996). The shift towards third sector housing results in a decentralized

housing system, which has become problematic for certain groups because of a lack of consistency between housing units and proximity to city-centres.

Although residential patterns differ between Canada and the United States, Canada has still witnessed residential segregation, albeit to a lesser extent (Fong & Wilkes, 2003). Amendments to immigration policies in the 1970s resulted in drastic increases in visible minorities in Canada. The increasingly diverse population has become challenging because of differences in socioeconomic resources and needs between racialized. Different groups require different support, however affordable housing demands increased in most large metropolitan areas. Bauder and Sharpe (2002) found that residential migration patterns were not random but instead were immersed within other residential constraints (i.e., social and political forces). In accordance with varying socioeconomic resources, certain groups are better off than others and their different resources will determine where they settle. In Toronto, visible minorities are decentralized and are most likely to reside in suburban neighbourhoods due to high costs associated with living in the city (Bauder & Sharpe, 2002, p. 216). While housing costs may result in concentrated poverty due to affordability for low-income families, Bauder and Sharpe (2002) argued that racialized groups in Canada were not “ghettoized” and were not isolated from other groups (p. 216). Their findings are inconsistent with Purdy’s (2003, 2005) research on Regent Park’s territorial stigmatization and the city of Toronto’s Strong Neighbourhood Task Force initiative (implemented in 2006).

Government funded housing was initially created to aid people in the most need, however it has further perpetuated race and class disparities. As such, “public housing became a federally funded institution that isolated families by race and class, resulting in

high concentrations of poor Black families in inner-city ghettos” (Wilson, 2008, p. 561). Academics have acknowledged that specific social policies have had detrimental effects on the spatial distribution of poverty. Spatially concentrated poverty and racialized groups are unfortunately not isolated to the United States; they are also evident in the Canadian context. Perceptions of both the public and government regarding Regent Park shifted from a public housing neighbourhood to a ‘ghetto’ that housed single-mothers and welfare dependent people (Purdy, 2005). The political and social exclusion faced by Blacks in the United States is also present in Canada, arguably to a lesser extent, but there is certainly a social construction of concentrated poverty in specific neighbourhoods. As such, race, place, social and political forces are inextricably linked in Canada and may determine the residential patterns across the country (Bauder & Sharpe, 2002; Fong & Wilkes, 2003; Neely & Samsura, 2011; Sundstrom, 2003; Teelucksingh, 2006).

### **Racialization of Crime and the Criminalization of Place**

I argue that the media’s role in racializing crime and criminalizing place helps to maintain marginalization of particular groups, specifically Black communities, in a position of subordination and powerlessness. Moreover, the persistent negative portrayals of Black people in the media and inner suburban neighbourhoods in which many reside reinforce the dominant view that they require social control. These depictions help to maintain portrayals of Black people as criminals and that inner suburban neighbourhoods lead to criminality. To examine how the media frames Kingston-Galloway, Canada’s largest concentration of public housing, I examine the neighbourhood within the context of a moral panic framework in the following chapter.

First however, I provide a brief demographic outline of the Kingston-Galloway neighbourhood.

### **Neighbourhood Profile: Kingston-Galloway**

After the high profile shooting of Jane Creba<sup>5</sup> in Toronto, the City of Toronto in partnership with the United Way of Greater Toronto established the Strong Neighbourhood Strategy. The project resulted in the City of Toronto identifying 13 priority neighbourhoods, all of which receive government funding to create new infrastructure and repair old and ageing infrastructure (City of Toronto & United Way of Greater Toronto, 2005). Additionally, it assists residents and community organizations in adequately delivering services and bringing new investments/services into the neighbourhood (City of Toronto & United Way of Greater Toronto, 2005). Ultimately, the goal is to make the neighbourhood more liveable (City of Toronto & United Way of Greater Toronto, 2005). The original 13 neighbourhoods were chosen based on the following criteria: prevalence of key services (i.e., libraries, schools, community centres and employment services), household income levels and educational attainment (n.a., *Toronto Star*, 2008 July 19, p. ID1).

Following the commencement of the pilot project in Scarborough Village in 2005, the project was executed in three phases in 2006, 2007 and 2008. Consistent with the concept of place, the City of Toronto adopted a socially constructed concept of neighbourhood when identifying neighbourhoods as priority areas, especially in identifying Kingston-Galloway. Of the 140 neighbourhood designations within Toronto,

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<sup>5</sup> On December 26, 2006, a 15 year old girl was caught in the cross fire of rival gangs in front of Toronto's Eaton Centre. The gunfight resulted in the innocent bystander Jane Creba killed and six others injured. This incident of gun violence in Toronto was covered extensively in news media, as the victim of gang violence was a grade 10 student who was shopping in the middle of the day in downtown Toronto.

Kingston-Galloway is not an identified neighbourhood. In fact, Kingston-Galloway is listed as a priority neighbourhood and “[is] *not* based on an aggregation of the City’s 140 neighbourhoods. [It is] based on community input and desire to have a ‘custom’ boundary (due to problems in accurate representation of the community at the census Tract (sic) level in that area)” (Harvey Low, personal communication, September 12, 2014). Moreover, by city staff identifying Kingston-Galloway as part of their priority neighbourhoods, they understand that place is constructed through meaning for each individual as each individual and their community come to affix meaning to it (Tuan, 1977).

It is evident that city staff understood the unique meaning of place for the Kingston-Galloway community, as the meaning of place was more important than the traditional census tract boundaries for its residents. Previous research on neighbourhood levels of violence utilize census tract information for convenience in examining aggregate neighbourhood levels of violence (Blau & Blau, 1982; Sampson, 1995; Thompson, 2009). However, they do not typically take into account the lack of meaning affixed to the areas for the residents. As such, my study accounts for the meaning of place – without the traditional government affixed boundary and thus lends well to examining Kingston-Galloway’s depiction within the media and its potential affect on residents and the audience at large.

Kingston-Galloway is described as a ‘tower neighbourhood,’ a term used to categorize neighbourhoods that have a high concentration of high-rise apartments. Moreover, this neighbourhood is isolated from surrounding areas, which is reinforced by train tracks that separate it from “an enclave of single-family homes” (Contenta, Powell

& Rankin, 2008, July 19, A1). In addition to Kingston-Galloway's geographic isolation, the residents are marginalized. The residents of the community experience social, political and economic isolation, that is, residents are marginalized within mainstream society. Demographic information obtained by the city of Toronto illustrates that the majority of the residents are impoverished, racialized immigrants (City of Toronto, 2006).

Previous research indicates that high concentrations of racialized minorities, poverty and persons with low educational attainment may result in neighbourhoods that experience increased levels of crime (Blau & Blau, 1982; Sampson, 1985). Table 1 illustrates that Kingston-Galloway fares negatively with the city of Toronto's average on almost all cited demographics. The demographic profile of Kingston-Galloway is consistent with other findings that suggest neighbourhoods have an increased chance of experiencing disproportionate rates of violence due to certain concentrations of socioeconomic factors. For example, Kingston-Galloway has a number of criminogenic factors such as, a high percentage of lone-parent households, a high percentage of low-income persons and a high concentration of visible minorities. Please see Table 1 for relevant census information for Kingston-Galloway for 2001 and 2006.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> 2011 data is not provided as the collection of information became voluntary for this year and may result in distorted depictions of the demographics of Kingston-Galloway. In an effort to present the most thorough data available, Table 1 presents only information for 2001 and 2006.

**Table 1: City of Toronto Demographics 2001 and 2006**

Characteristics	2001		2006 <sup>7</sup>	
	Kingston-Galloway	City of Toronto	Kingston-Galloway	City of Toronto
15-24 Years of Age	13.7%	12.5%	13.6%	12.5%
% Lone Parent Household	31.5%	19.7%	32.5%	20.3%
Average Household Income	\$55,271.00	\$69,125.00	\$47,770.00	\$63,870.00
% Low Income Persons	33.9%	22.6%	29.0%	19.4%
% Immigrant Population	50.1%	49.4%	n/a	n/a
% Visible Minorities	58.2%	42.8%	61.4%	n/a
Youth Unemployment Rate	16.6%	13.2%	15.3%	16.6%

(Not available is denoted by n/a)

(City of Toronto 2006, 2008).

<sup>7</sup> City of Toronto staff identified that the 2006 Census may have undercounted Toronto's population more than usual and this may impact the 2006 data presented in the above table (City of Toronto, 2014).

### **Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework**

Research on inner city neighbourhoods, Black communities and gun violence suggest that the media construct moral panics around these topics (Schissel, 1997). Consistent negative portrayals of certain populations, I argue, result in detrimental effects that extend far beyond the specific group to the place that the group resides. Additionally, I argue that neighbourhood portrayals are constructed within a moral panic framework. In this chapter I will provide an overview of Cohen's moral panic framework, criticisms of his original work, and an interpretation of my own which will be used as a framework for this thesis.

#### **Overview of Cohen's Moral Panic Theory**

In an effort to explain the term moral panic, Stanley Cohen (1972) offers this introduction to the term:

Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible. Sometimes the object of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is something which has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight. Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way society conceives itself (p. 9).

While this excerpt provides an introduction to the term, Garland (2008) notes that the term "panic" lacks sufficient clarity in Cohen's conceptualization, although he stated that Cohen must mean "panic" in its most conventional usage (p. 10). Consequently, a moral panic has the ability to significantly impact social policy and legislative changes as

politicians act (often opportunistically) to protect the vulnerable in society from folk devils. It is important to note that the focus of Cohen's work is not the deviant act or perceived deviance of a group, but rather, the *responses* to the perceived deviance. Thus, the reaction implies that a moral panic is not static, instead, ebbing and flowing with evolving social values.

Cohen's (1972) foundational work on the introduction of the moral panic framework derives from the Mods and Rockers phenomenon that occurred during the 1960s in Britain. These two distinct youth groups were the focal point of mass attention from various social actors, and after receiving unprecedented scrutiny from the media it extended to a generalized belief about the groups. Cohen (1972) argued that the public's fear of Mods and Rockers was disproportionate to the actions of the group in part because of the exaggerated and fabricated accounts reported by media.

In the creation of this paradigm, Cohen grounded his work in the labeling perspective and disaster theory, both typically evoking responses and actions from government and society at large. The following section provides an overview of labeling theory in relation to Cohen's work.

### **Moral Panic and Labeling**

Moral panic falls within the social constructionist school of thought, specifically within the context of the labeling perspective. The labeling perspective is not concerned with the *causes* of deviant behaviours, but instead, emphasizes the importance and implications of ascribing a deviant and/or delinquent label to an individual or group (Tanner, 2010, p. 77). Indeed, innocent persons are not selected at random to receive the deviant label. The targets of a moral panic, as Garland (2008) noted, are "cultural

scapegoats” (p. 15) whose deviant actions create anxiety among society because it touches upon individual fears. Adopting such a label does not necessarily mean that persons who receive this label will internalize and adopt the identity of that label. The deviant label simply implies that the individual *may* engage in deviant behaviours but that it is not a precursor to deviant actions and/or behaviours (Cohen, 1972, p. 14). Becker (1963) argued that the emphasis of study should be on the *label* ascribed to the behaviour rather than the individual because labels were created by those who hold economic and political power. This implies that labels are constantly changing and evolving to allow other groups to be typified. This allows those in a position of power to maintain their authority by oppressing other groups and casting them as social *others*.

In accordance with the labeling perspective and deviant behaviours, Lemert (1967) extended the perspective and asserts that there are two types of deviation: primary and secondary. Primary deviance refers to behaviours or actions that have relatively insignificant impacts on the perpetrators (DeKeseredy, Ellis & Alvi, 2005). However, a label affixed to an individual may in turn lead them to internalize the negative label, and if they act on it, to result in secondary deviance. Secondary deviance ensues when the individual engages in more rule-breaking behaviour because they are perceived by society as troublesome, or deviant, therefore potentially experiencing blocked social, political and economic opportunities (Lemert, 1967). Consequently, the labeling perspective can be understood as cyclical; persons are labeled deviant, and because of the negative reception they experience from society, they engage in more deviant behaviour.

It is this perspective that underpins Cohen’s moral panic theory. Cohen (1972) maintains that the youth- the Mods and Rockers – were identified as deviant, or folk

devils, via media outlets, police officers and business owners, thus suggesting that negative labels are affixed to certain groups and subsequently amplified within a moral panic.

### **Moral Panic Framework**

In addition to the labeling perspective, Cohen also borrowed from disaster theory to construct the moral panic framework. A moral panic, Cohen argued, consists of four stages: (1) warning phase; (2) impact phase; (3) inventory phase; and, (4) reaction phase (Cohen, 1972). The four-stage model is adapted from a seven-stage disaster model; this is because unlike natural disasters, moral panics do not encompass all seven stages. Another adaption to the disaster model is that moral panics, unlike disasters, are not linear; instead, they are “circular and amplifying” (Cohen, 1972, p. 24). In sum, the impact, or deviance occurs, then a reaction follows which in turn can heighten the warning and impact phase, thus setting up what Cohen labels a “feedback system” (Cohen, 1972, p. 24).

While Cohen’s theory offers a strong starting point, the original moral panic framework lacks sufficient clarity and has ultimately become out dated due to the expansion and dissemination of new stories and the types of social topics that create social anxiety (Altheide, 2009; Garland, 2008; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009; McRobbie & Thornton, 1995; Ungar, 2001; Victor, 1998). The most cited adaption of Cohen’s original framework is provided by Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009). For the purposes of my work, Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s (2009) adaption will provide an introduction to my own variation of the moral panic framework. The work of Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) extended and modified Cohen’s framework, positioning this theory as applicable

to a wider range of topics, and it clarifies areas of uncertainty within the original moral panic theory. In particular, their framework aims to add a testable hypothesis by providing five criteria that characterize a moral panic, which will be explained further.

**Concern.** The first stage of a moral panic is concern. This phase is demarcated by an increased anxiety over a specific behavior of a group and is measurable. Opinion polls, public surveys, media attention, and arrest numbers all constitute a measurable form of societal concern (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009, p. 37).

**Hostility.** Following a period of escalated concern relating to a social issue, hostility ensues. The hostility that erupts is from society towards the group causing the condition or episode; it allows society to band together against a certain group. This phase involves constructing the group as folk devils, evildoers, social others, and overall, contributing to the moral degradation of society. Furthermore, the folk devil status (re)produces and reinforces an “us” versus “them” dichotomy. The “us” – good, respectable persons of society – and “them” – folk devils, bad deviant, villains. Overall, the hostility produced and embedded within society against a group in turn vilifies that specific target group (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009, p. 38).

**Consensus.** To substantiate a moral panic, a consensus or widespread agreement among society, or a subset of society, is required. In other words, the threat is perceived as real, imminent and serious; it requires action to be taken to protect society from moral decay. Although moral panics vary in severity and degree, it can result in differing levels of consensus among and between societal groups. Although reactions may result in “group or regional variation” (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009, p. 39), a moral panic may still exist (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009, pp. 38-40). Presently, societal responses are

varied, and it is unlikely that responses will be monolithic, as was seen with the Mods and Rockers (McRobbie & Thornton, 1995).

**Disproportion.** The fourth element of a moral panic is disproportion. Within moral panic discourse it is argued that the actions of the folk devils are exaggerated in the media to instill fear about the group(s). Disproportion results in members of the general public having increased levels of fear about an issue or group, despite evidence supporting the contrary. It is within this stage that stories, figures and statistics are generated and disseminated to produce an exaggerated portrayal of the perceived problem. As such, disproportion plays a central role in the concept of moral panics; without it, the argument that a moral panic exists cannot be made (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009, pp. 40-41).

**Volatility.** The final characteristic of a moral panic is its volatility. As Cohen (1972) identified, the panic arises suddenly, can last for a period of time, disappear or reappear at a later period of time (p. 9). Some moral panics occur and have lasting effects, for example, legislative amendments, policing and enforcement practices (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009, pp. 41-43).

As previously identified, moral panic research tends to investigate one topic or crisis at a time, while ignoring others (Ungar, 2001). This narrow focus does not take into account the detrimental effects that occur around an intersection of topics that inadvertently have the potential to construct a moral panic around an entire place. Overall, moral panics are evident of collective behaviour; it appears and disappears with evolving societal values and beliefs. The focal point of this theory is that there is

collective agreement in regards to targeting a specific folk devil in relation to the actual threat.

Briefly, Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) present three theories to explain how moral panics begin and evolve over time. First, the *grassroots model* argues that the panic emerges from the general public. The anxiety surrounding the moral deviants – folk devils – is the result of widespread concern. This theory maintains that even if the media or political figures appear to have started the fear, the concern is already present within society; these actors cannot exaggerate a fear that was not previously present (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009, pp. 55-57). It can then be understood that the folk devils are a collective scapegoat via social anxieties placed upon them. After becoming a cultural scapegoat for society, the group is now recognized through cultural symbols that are the real social anxieties (Victor, 1998, pp. 546-547).

Second, the *elite-engineered model* purports that those who hold a position of power generate panic around issues that would not normally result in public anxiety. It is argued that the powerful highlight certain issues to divert attention away from the root causes of specific social ills (e.g., poverty). Arguably, by not addressing the root causes of serious social ills, it allows those in power to maintain their position over other less powerful groups. The media portrays stories that are presented by powerful elites and it is the elites who frame specific issues in a manner that is congruent with their agenda (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009, pp. 62-66). Therefore, the elite maintain their position of power through fear, which can be used to support punitive crime control measures against the target group(s).

And third, the *interest-group* model is similar to Becker's (1963) notion that the rule creators and moral crusaders push for action to be taken against behaviours they find to be unacceptable (pp. 146- 162). Unlike the elite-engineered model, this theory maintains that rule changes come from middle groups in society rather than the top-down approach taken by the previous model. It can then be understood that this theory is in direct conflict with the elite-engineered model because middle groups want to alter and/or revoke policies that powerful groups have created (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009, pp. 67-69).

While the above three theories have been put forth to address the origins of moral panics, it is difficult to identify a moral panic that fits within just one of these theories. Instead, many moral panics encompass elements from two or all three of the aforementioned theories. Therefore, my study integrates aspects from both the elite-engineered model as well as the interest group model. Prior to introducing my theoretical adaption of moral panic, I will address the criticisms that have been raised since the theory's inception.

### **Criticisms of Moral Panic Theory**

Among the vast moral panic literature, criticisms have been raised, in relation to the fact that the theory was presented in the 1960's and has lost its applicability because of expanding social problems and the rise of globalization. This section will address the most prominent criticisms that have been brought forth against the moral panic theory.

The following critiques will be addressed:

- (i) Moral panics center on one topic;

- (ii) How can we objectively state that a reaction is disproportionate to the act or behaviour in question? And, in proportion to what?;
- (iii) Folk devils are no longer as marginalized as they once were;
- (iv) Presently, there is a plurality of social reactions as opposed to the social polarization that occurred with the Mods and Rockers phenomenon;
- (v) Media consumption, and methods of news delivery is expanding, thus, there is a requirement to be able to account for these changes within the theory;
- (vi) Moral panics can be about real social problems (e.g., child pornography); and,
- (vii) Certain topics do not fit the moral panic theory, despite yielding similar societal responses.

As discussed previously, moral panics tend to focus on one topic (e.g., youth crime, gun violence, gang violence). This narrow focus becomes problematic when trying to apply the framework to intersections of social concerns. Cohen's (1972) definition of moral panic includes the term "folk devil" – deviant or evil doers – but by typifying a group negates the use of moral panic within other areas of study. That is, folk devil status is intended for an individual or group of individuals, and as Ungar (2001) noted, neglects topics such as environmental or health hazards because there is no identifiable group to vilify. As is similar with my current research, place is a social and geographic construct (Adams, Hoelscher, & Till, 2001; Cresswell, 1996; Cresswell, 2006), however, place(s) that receive a negative label typically encompass multiple groups that are stigmatized during periods of moral panic. As such, while the original moral panic framework focuses on one group, as has much of the subsequent literature, the theory can

be applicable beyond one group at a time, and can extend to an entire geographic neighbourhood.

The most widely cited problem, labeling an event as a moral panic, is determining how to objectively identify when a social reaction is disproportionate to the behavior in question (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009; Ungar, 2001). To address this concern, Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) provide five indicators that the public's level of fear is disproportionate to the actual deviant behavior. First, figures that are "*grossly exaggerated*" (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009, p. 44, emphasis in original) are presented to the public in an attempt to illustrate that the "problem" is real and imminent. Such exaggerations are used in a manner that suggests the perceived problem, or social ill, is becoming prominent within society and the issue demands immediate attention. This criterion is utilized to grab the attention of the wider public.

For example, when media and politicians argue that gun violence is on the rise, immediate action(s) is required, and the moral decay of a community is near, they present figures that illustrate drastic increases in gun offences from previous years. The problem is that with any extreme score, those numbers will regress back to the mean and not remain an anomaly. Much of the media's fear narrative suggests that gun violence will expand and reach all neighbourhoods, thus leaving *all* citizens at equal risk of victimization; however such claims are inaccurate. It is well documented that Black people are disproportionately over represented as both perpetrators and victims of gun violence (Gartner & Thompson, 2004; Phillips, 1997) and some scholars link the involvement to macro structural characteristics (Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003; Sampson, 1985, 1991), while others have associated micro-level characteristics with increased

involvement in criminal acts (Hughes & Short, 2005). Therefore, seemingly there are “hot spots” and “not spots” of crime. Those which indicate certain individuals and neighbourhoods are at an increased risk of experiencing gun violence, and other neighbourhoods which appear to have protective factors, insulating them from experiencing such violence (see, Charron, 2009; Gartner & Thompson, 2004; Thompson, 2009). This suggests that despite empirical evidence, not everyone is at an equal risk of victimization by a handgun, however the media and political actors continue to construct fear by suggesting they are.

Second, figures are fabricated to entice fear. This means that the actual threat is non-existent, however, the media still creates fear around the issue (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009, pp. 44). Third, rumours are constructed and then believed, despite the lack of real harm. Within this context, figures are not presented to the public. Instead, the story largely revolves around a legend or an urban tale that evokes fear (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009, p. 45).

Fourth, although other harmful conditions exist or are present, a vast amount of attention is given to one specific condition, irrespective of the condition not causing any more or less harm than others. For example, the panic surrounding illegal drugs. The same concern for prescription drugs seems non-existent among the general public. The harms generated by illegal drugs are not greater than the harms produced by prescription drugs; however, public concern appears to see the harm as different (Goode, 2008, as cited in Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009, pp. 45-46).

Finally, changes over time relate to the historic attention paid to a condition despite a lack of any objective increase (or decrease) in the seriousness of the condition.

If this can be established, then the criterion of disproportionality has been met. An example of the previous two criteria would be the panic that took place between the 1980's and early 1990's around illegal drug use. Public polls found that drugs quickly became the most pressing social problem for the general public (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009). Despite illegal drugs existing prior to this surge in fear, and the continued use of street drugs today, the rise in public concern has declined since the early 1990's. Ultimately, no theory is without faults, but the five criteria put forward by Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) provide a good foundation to address the topic of disproportionate fear in relation to neighbourhoods and territorial stigmatization.

A moral panic emerges due to a fear surrounding, what Cohen (1972) called, folk devils. A folk devil is a specific group that begins to be the focus of intense media, political and societal scrutiny. When stories are constructed and distorted within media headlines, certain words and symbols begin to be negatively associated with the group(s) of focus, and it is these images that "are made much sharper than reality" (Cohen, 1972, p. 43). The folk devil status has raised criticisms among some scholars, such as McRobbie and Thornton (1995) and Ungar (2001), however for two very different reasons.

First, McRobbie and Thornton (1995) argued that the framework should be expanded to account for the globalization of media outlets and story dissemination. Further, they challenged Cohen's (1972) folk devil status as powerless and marginalized groups outright. The long-standing notion of folk devils as groups who are powerless, is no more, they suggest. Instead, these groups have gained political and social power in

numbers; once marginalized groups have gained the attention of lobby groups who now push for those individuals' interests and welfare among political actors and parties.

Second, the viewpoints being presented among media outlets are much less monolithic than they once were – magazines, newspapers, and television news channels are reporting the stories of the marginalized groups – from their own perspective (i.e., news is being made *by* those groups *for* those groups) (McRobbie & Thornton, 1995). Garland (2008) argued that folk devils may now hold more power and have the ability to resist the negative labels placed on the group. This, he asserted, is because they have power to resist the negative labels, and place “social value and normality [on] their conduct” (p. 17). For example, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender community has fought negative stereotypes and has been able to obtain the legalization of same-sex marriage in Canada and some parts of the United States (Garland, 2008, p. 17).

While I agree that groups that are constructed as folk devils have gained some power over the years than they once had, it is still the more powerful folk devils (e.g., politically powerful) who have the capacity to have their voices heard. This still leaves the most vulnerable groups to political, social and economic exploitation. To further illustrate that certain groups have largely maintained their folk devil status, affluent Black communities tend to disassociate themselves with poor Black people or Black people who have come into contact with the law (Anderson, 1999; Peffley & Hurwitz, 2010). For instance, Black police officers tend to police predominantly Black communities and the residents within those neighbourhoods more harshly than White police officers (Barlow & Barlow, 2002; Brown & Frank, 2006; Kuykendall & Burns, 1980). This behaviour can create a polarization within Black communities, leaving the most socially,

economically and politically disadvantaged in an apparent position of inferiority among members of their own group.

The concept of folk devil status is limiting because it restricts the topics that can be labeled a moral panic (Ungar, 2001). Such topics include environmental and health scares such as oil spills, ozone layer depletion and E. coli outbreaks. Because these topics do not have an identifiable folk devil, these panics are considered part of a “risk society” (see, Beck, 1992; Beck, Giddens, & Lash, 1994; Garland, 2003). The risks categorized under the risk society still garner public fear. Despite the fact that the risks may not fit into the moral panic framework, does not mean that the research on risk cannot be utilized to improve and strengthen the moral panic literature, in terms of identifying risk or panic.

The risk society, beyond what Ungar described it as, has arisen in large part because of the current neoliberal state. The shift from the welfare state to the current neoliberal governance has resulted in smaller and leaner governments. In effect, there is less emphasis on government funded social programs and a shift towards community partnerships (Wacquant, 2010). The current post-welfare state has reshaped crime-prevention initiatives, which has resulted in managing risk, such as “predicting risk and employing risk-based techniques” (Goddard, 2012, p. 348). Goddard (2012) stated that “Risk is now central to the management of exclusion in post-welfare strategies of control” (p. 348). In accordance with neoliberalism, the government downloads the responsibility of safety to citizens. That is, individual members of society are expected to play a vital role in their own, and their community’s safety, what Goddard (2012) cited as “responsibilization”. Under the guise of mitigating risks, community programs are to

measure risks associated with certain groups, and those groups are typically young impoverished Black males.

Predicting risk and utilizing risk-based techniques is largely an exclusionary process (Kemshall, 2008). Certain groups and individuals are perceived to pose a greater threat to the safety and security of society, and as such members of society are made to believe these groups should be controlled (Garland, 2003). Risk societies and the fear surrounding social concerns is generated and disseminated through media portrayals of these stories, much like moral panics. The media's method of getting news out has altered and expanded overtime. Although moral panic originated through newspapers, methods of news distribution have expanded to now include 24-hour news cycles on television, opinion editorial sections and blogs. The medium from which individuals obtain their news determines whether the story becomes constructed within a moral panic framework. Certain mediums are more amenable to (re)produce and perpetuate moral panic when compared to others (Altheide, 2009). The growth of the news making industry (as well as cyber methods of communication such as Facebook and Twitter) has led some scholars to make the claim that moral panic theory needs to be revamped (McRobbie & Thornton, 1995).

While many moral panics create fear among society over issues that may not in fact be an imminent threat for the vast majority of the population, this does not mean that moral panics are unfounded. The public can be fearful of certain issues (e.g., child pornography) because it poses a real threat to the victims, but it is subject to scrutiny. For example, whether or not it meets the five criteria delineated by Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) of disproportionality.

Finally, the concern has been raised that certain topics do not fit the moral panic threshold. For example, the topic of terrorism meets all the criteria of a moral panic however., Many have argued that because of the real and imminent threat it poses, the actions taken to protect against another terrorist attack have not resulted in a moral panic because the media have not framed it in such a manner and/or have avoided doing so because of ethical concerns (see, Altheide, 2009; Garland, 2008 [cf. Mueller, 2006; Rothe & Muzzatti, 2004; Welch, 2006]). Despite the contesting viewpoints on the applicability of moral panic theory, I argue that it can be altered to address issues to which it would not normally apply, especially topics which involve intersectionally (i.e., racialized groups, guns, gangs *and* neighbourhoods).

### **Neighbourhoods and Moral Panic**

As discussed previously, research suggests that moral panics have focused on singular events such as youth crime, gun and gang violence, and terrorism. While these topics do yield panic among members of the public, I argue that this panic can originate from one incident that receives disproportionate media attention and then extends to a panic around a specific neighbourhood. Therefore, such extensions begin to construct portrayals of place and can be harmful for the residents of those communities as well as the place itself (Slater & Anderson, 2011). The harm here comes in the form of less attention and funding from government, over policing of neighbourhoods, and the perpetuation of negative stereotypes of the residents which impacts employment opportunities (postcode discrimination) (Anderson, 1999; Darity & Mason, 1998). As such, I utilize the moral panic framework to analyze and explain the media's construction of place, specifically in reference to Kingston-Galloway.

Like Cohen's (1972) original framework that he described as "circular and amplifying" (p. 24), my framework also involves a feedback loop. What I believe is absent from Cohen's theory as well as Goode and Ben-Yehuda's (2009) adaption is an account for the individual level of fear. Fear can transpire prior to a moral panic erupting; different groups - racial and socioeconomic groups - interpret and internalize news stories differently (Weitzer & Kubrin, 2004).

A significant factor in the internalizations of news stories is the relationship between individuals' demographic factors along with the neighbourhood characteristics in which they reside (Chiricos, et al., 1997; Weitzer & Kubrin, 2004). Disadvantaged neighbourhoods that experience disproportionately high levels of crime tend to have a large percentage of Black residents (Blau & Blau, 1982; Peterson & Kirvo, 2005; Sampson, 1985). These audience members are not likely to have experienced high levels of fear of crime because they have a lived experience of violent crime within their neighbourhood (Weitzer & Kubrin, 2004). Conversely, individuals residing in more affluent and less violent communities may internalize news stories of crime and place differently, potentially increasing their individual level of fear. As such, media distortion of levels of crime can impact certain segments of society differently and it can also have potentially detrimental effects, specifically in relation to stereotyping and neighbourhoods. Because of the significant impact on the individual level of fear, it is essential to account for this in the moral panic framework in an attempt to obtain a more nuanced understanding of the progression of moral panics.

There are multiple actors that impact the individual level fear of crime such as residents, neighbourhood demographics, gangs, gun violence and police. In specific


reference to Kingston-Galloway, the residents and neighbourhood demographics are intertwined. As I illustrated in the previous chapter, 50.2% of the residents in this area are new immigrants and almost 60% are visible minorities (Table 1). It is not surprising then, that this neighbourhood tends to receive disproportionate negative media attention due to the high percentage of visible minorities residing within this community, positioning them as the social other.

Media reports tend to focus on Black communities criminality while focusing less on Black victims (Henry & Tator, 2009; Wortley, 2008). This has been attributed to the belief that Black people are immersed within a subculture of crime that is inherent to their values and beliefs, or rather, that they adhere to the code of the street (Anderson, 1999; Kubrin & Weitzer, 2005), whereas White criminal behaviour is portrayed as individual pathology (Wortley, 2008, p. 55).

The residents, neighbourhood dynamics<sup>8</sup>, police, government and media, can all affect the individual level fear of crime of both insiders and outsiders, albeit differently for different individuals. Therefore, the individual's fear of crime and a moral panic can be placed on a spectrum, with the fear of crime on the left, progressing to a moral panic towards the right, as depicted in Figure 1.

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<sup>8</sup> Neighbourhood dynamics encompasses the following factors: socioeconomic composition, race and crime rates of a specified neighbourhood.

**Figure 1:**

Depending on the types of offences occurring in the neighbourhood, the media may or may not report the story. The types of offences that are reported are typically over sensationalized stories that become headline news (Tamang, 2009, p. 198). Therefore, the tendency to report sensational news, typically violent gun and gang offences, distorts the line between reality and sensationalized fabrications of crimes and the frequency of these crimes among certain neighbourhoods (Lee, 2006). The overly simplistic portrayal of the stories and neighbourhoods results in perpetuating levels of fear among society and distorting the stories and figures, which in turn can result in increased attention from police, politicians, government officials, lobby groups and special interest groups. As Cohen (1972) and Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) argue, increased media attention, together with the intervention from social actors can lead to a moral panic. It is important to note that this process is not linear, but rather, cyclical. Therefore, police, government, lobby groups and special interest groups have used the


media for their own political gain in an attempt to advance their agendas. This is apparent through initiatives such as TAVIS (Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy), increasing mandatory minimum sentences for gun and gang related crimes, and the Guns and Gangs Task Force implemented by the Ontario government. It can be argued that policy responses are adopted as a result of moral panic that is out of proportion to the actual volume and seriousness of crime – for example, those relating to both gun and gang violence. Indeed, Toronto remains one of the safest large cities in North America.

The constant negative portrayals of violent crimes occurrences in certain communities that are reproduced through media stories can create fear of its residents and the entire neighbourhood, which may result in territorial stigmatization (Purdy, 2005). Fear surrounding certain crimes extends from the individuals to the place, which is then perceived as a “slum” or “ghetto” (Purdy, 2005). As Cohen (1972) identified, moral panics do not last forever, some panics stay for an extended period of time while others diminish quickly. Others can re-emerge years later, demonstrating that the process of a moral panic is cyclical. Despite the decrease in media attention surrounding certain crimes over time, does not mean the negative image of place fades as well.

In sum, Figure 2 illustrates the theoretical process in which place identity occurs. The actors (i.e., residents, neighbourhood demographics, police, government and media) all interact and affect an individual’s level of fear of crime. Depending on the types of activities occurring within the neighbourhood, the media may disseminate stories, which in turn can also affect an individual’s fear of crime. Further, the type of stories the media constructs can also acquire attention from social actors, including government officials, police, lobby groups, and special interest groups- if they have a stake in the occurrences.

After increased attention from these social actors, they in turn utilize the media to propagate their ideas, which tend to result in punitive crime control measures to restrict a subset of the population who have been deemed to play a vital role in the moral degradation of society. It is a sense of fear and urgency of a situation that the media and social actors cultivate within the minds of the public that can in turn ignite in a moral panic. The fear among society - moral panic - itself can also receive attention from social actors, but the panic extends beyond the individual actors to the entire neighbourhood, constructing a neighbourhood identity of a ghetto, slum and criminal breeding ground. These negative images not only become engrained within the minds of the general public, but also within the minds of the residents and can impact the way in which they interact with their neighbourhood (e.g., low levels of community attachment) (Brown, Perkins & Brown, 2003; Permentier, van Ham & Bolt, 2009).

**Figure 2:**



Indeed, the construction of place has long lasting and detrimental effects for residents of the neighbourhood, social policy implications and society at large, as will be further discussed in chapter five.

**Summary**

The original moral panic framework and its recent amendments can be understood as the media’s simplistic and disproportionate emphasis on a specific issue that typecasts a marginalized group. This in turn garners the attention of government officials who then

have the ability to start a moral panic. Although, as Garland (2008), McRobbie and Thornton (1995), and Ungar (2001) have noted, the concept of moral panics is in need of revision. As my current research emphasizes, place identity and the privileging of certain images of groups over others, I altered the moral panic framework to account for the novelty of this issue within the criminological literature. My revision accounts for the individual level of fear as it has been identified as impacting people's internalizations of media portrayals of crime and the way it impacts how not only society perceives the neighbourhood, but also the manner in which residents view their community and their overall attachment to place. The following chapter delineates the method I employ to examine the media's framing of Kingston- Galloway between 1998-2012.

## Chapter 4: Method

Newspapers, are still consumed on a daily basis by a significant proportion of the Canadian population, and thus remain a useful site of social inquiry (Cho, Martin & Lacy, 2006; Maxwell & Wanta, 2001; Newspaper Canada, 2014). My thesis employs a qualitative approach to examine the Toronto print media's construction of Kingston-Galloway. To do so, I analyzed articles from the *Toronto Star* and the *Toronto Sun*, the two local newspapers in the Greater Toronto Area with the largest circulation (Newspaper Canada, 2014). Specifically, I drew on a qualitative technique to examine how these two newspapers, of opposing political leanings constructed race, crime and ultimately fear of a certain neighbourhood (i.e., an inner suburban neighbourhood).

First, I present the *frequency* and *types* of news reports that appear in each of my sampled articles referencing Kingston-Galloway. Second, I present the frame analysis to qualitatively analyse *how* news reports have framed Kingston-Galloway over my 14-year period of analysis and to explore the manner in which these reports are presented to the public. In this chapter, I first discuss the relevance of newspapers for my current inquiry, present an overview of my methodological approach, identify my sample selection, and finally, discuss how the data has been analysed within this study.

### Newspapers as a Relevant Medium

The sample of news media selected for this study is grounded in a modified version of moral panic theory (see Chapter 3). Altheide (2009) purported that print media is more conducive to moral panics when compared to other forms of media, such as television news. Moral panics are more prevalent in print media outlets because they are formatted in a manner that selects and presents stories that promote a discourse of

fear (Altheide, 2009). Typically, newspapers include sections such as editorials and opinion pieces and each story is selected by staff who determine what type(s) of stories will be published. Moreover, research demonstrates that local news reports impact audience levels of fear more than national news reports (Chiricos, et al., 1997; Jewkes, 2004; Weitzer & Kubrin, 2004). Although my thesis does not measure audience levels of fear of crime after exposure to news reports, it is important to examine how local news media frame Kingston-Galloway as local news has been shown to affect levels of fear of crime amongst its audience. Therefore, I examine local news media's portrayal of Kingston-Galloway to examine how they present race, place and crime to their readers.

### **Sample**

While there has been a shift in newspapers delivering their content through an online format, the present analysis focuses on newspaper articles that appeared in print. This decision was made because during the period of analysis, print remained the dominant method of delivery of newspapers (Newspaper Canada, 2014). In 2008<sup>9</sup>, the daily and weekly circulations of total Canadian newspapers were 4.3 million and 28 million, respectively. The total daily and weekly Canadian newspaper circulation increased in 2012<sup>10</sup>, to 6.01 million and, 35.9 million papers, respectively (Newspaper Canada, 2014). The increase in daily and weekly circulation from 2008 to 2012 indicates that print media, during my sample remains a relevant source for analysis. In Toronto, the two local newspapers with the largest circulations are the *Toronto Star* and the *Toronto Sun*. By the end of 2008, the *Toronto Star* circulated 335,680 copies daily and 2.3 million copies weekly. In 2012, daily and weekly circulation numbers increased to

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<sup>9</sup> I use 2008 as a comparative year as it is the earliest documented circulation report that Newspaper Canada provides.

<sup>10</sup> I compare 2008 to 2012 because 2012 is the final year that I collected newspaper articles.

357,612 and 2.5 million copies, respectively. Comparatively, in 2008, the *Toronto Sun* had a daily circulation of 166,123 and a weekly circulation of 1.16 million copies. The circulation increased in 2012 to 169,219 daily copies circulated and 1.18 million copies circulated weekly (Newspaper Canada, 2014). As these newspapers have weekly circulations over one million copies, both papers serve as a strong basis for analysis, and have the largest readership in the Greater Toronto Area.

The timeframe for my analysis spans across 14 years, which begins from January 1, 1998 and concludes on December 31, 2012, inclusive. My current inquiry begins in 1998 because it was at this point that six municipalities, which made up the former Municipality of Toronto, including Scarborough (where the Kingston-Galloway is located), were amalgamated to form a single municipality – the city of Toronto (Schwartz, 2009). Prior to 1998, Scarborough was a suburban neighbourhood located east of Toronto. To ensure consistency throughout my analysis, I was only concerned with reports that included Kingston-Galloway as part of the city of Toronto and not as an independent suburban municipality. My analysis concluded on December 31, 2012 as this was the last full year of data I was able to obtain once I began data collection. Furthermore, 2012 was also the last year that digital access was not calculated in newspaper circulation reports (Newspaper Canada, 2014), and as such ensures the highest level of consistency within my sample. While most studies that examine moral panic focus on a shorter time period, my study examined articles across a 14-year period of analysis. This allowed for an examination of whether reporting increased during specific years rather than months. This approach provided the opportunity to approach moral panic from a longitudinal perspective to assess the validity that moral panics are cyclical.

To obtain news reports from the *Toronto Star* I used a comprehensive online database, *Canadian Newsstand Torstar*. I searched for articles that contained the term “Kingston-Galloway” between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2012, inclusive. To acquire *Toronto Sun* articles, I utilized the *Sun Media Newspaper Archives* with the keyword search “Kingston-Galloway” during the same timeframe indicated above. The *Toronto Star* and *Toronto Sun* search yielded 71 and 24 articles, respectively. Other search terms such as “Galloway Boys”, “G Boys” and “Danzig Street” were excluded from the search because I did not want to include gang names or specific areas that witnessed an increase in crime. If search terms like these were included, they would have arbitrarily inflated the crime reports and would have subsequently skewed my analysis of how the neighbourhood was framed overall.

### **Data Analysis**

In the present study, I first determined the *frequency* with which major themes emerged in the *Toronto Star* and *Toronto Sun*'s portrayal of Kingston-Galloway. In doing so, I identified major themes over time and related the themes to events that were occurring in Kingston-Galloway. I then used these themes as my starting point for further qualitative analysis, examining in more detail the meaning of the major themes that emerged during the initial stage of data analysis. This phase of the research also allowed for the development of a number of sub-themes, ideas and constructs to emerge through a closer reading of the data.

**Data familiarization.** Upon obtaining the articles, I formatted the articles in date order, from oldest to most current, and then formatted them into individual “cases.” At this stage, articles from the *Toronto Star* and the *Toronto Sun* remained separate. Once

the articles were in date order, I engaged in data familiarization, which involved reading through each case to become familiar with the topics, themes, ideas and problems that were captured within the data (Howitt, 2013, p. 183). I then read each article a second time, while making general notes about the most apparent and most frequently occurring themes (e.g., crime, criminal justice, neighbourhood improvement etc.). After reading the articles for the second time, I began my data analysis.

### **Thematic Analysis**

As I was interested in understanding the context and meaning behind the most prevalent themes arising in news articles that discussed Kingston-Galloway, I employed a method that Henry and Bjornson (1999) employed in their study. Their study examined the racialization of Toronto's print media, and employed a discourse analysis; their study yielded 2658 articles that referenced 'Jamaica' or 'Jamaicans' from both the *Toronto Star* and the *Toronto Sun*. To establish themes, the authors examined a sample of 300 articles inclusive of both papers, and the articles were read to establish the most prevalent themes. The remainder of the articles were read and then placed into one of the pre-established categories. Although my search did not result in the same volume of articles, I adjusted their method to accommodate my smaller sample size. As part of the data familiarization stage, I read all articles and developed a list of the most relevant themes as they appeared, however, I did not categorize the articles at this stage. By gathering all of the themes prior to categorizing the articles, it allowed me to ensure that after all themes were identified, and each article was correctly categorized.

After the second reading of each article, nine main themes emerged. Articles were then read for a third time and placed into one of the nine pre-established categories.

The nine themes that emerged were: crime/criminal justice, neighbourhood improvement, crime as a social ill, arts/culture, politics, sports, neighbourhood stigma, education, non-crime social problems. Tables were created to organize the articles, specifically to distinguish the month and year each article was written. Each table had columns for each month, and rows for each main theme. To ensure I was able to analyse each newspaper separately, the *Toronto Star* and the *Toronto Sun* were organized in separate tables, which were then used to analyse the frequency of reports about Kingston-Galloway. Each article was placed into *one* theme and was not coded into multiple themes, which is consistent with the approach taken by Henry and Bjornson (1999). Listed below are descriptions of each theme, which provides context for how each article was placed into a theme.

**Crime/criminal justice.** Any article that specifically discussed a criminal incident that occurred in Kingston-Galloway was placed in this category. For example, if a robbery or stabbing occurred and/or the police were looking for a suspect from Kingston-Galloway, the articles were placed in this category.

Also, any article that discussed a Court's decision, increased policing in Kingston-Galloway, police raids etc., was placed in this category. Overall, if an article's main theme was concerned with crime or the criminal justice system, its functions and how it was being implemented within the community, the article was categorized within the crime/criminal justice theme.

**Neighbourhood Improvement.** Any article that discussed programs or social services that were being developed to help Kingston-Galloway was placed within this category. Programs that discussed improving Kingston-Galloway's infrastructure, social

and/or economic sustainability were categorized within this theme. This category also included articles that discussed educational programs that targeted priority neighbourhoods to increase the overall well-being of the neighbourhood. As previous research indicates, education serves as a protective factor, allowing youth and adults to abstain from criminal involvement, and as such support the overall concept of neighbourhood improvement (Pettit & Western, 2004; Reynolds, Ou & Topitzes, 2004; Thornberry & Farnworth, 1982).

**Crime as a social ill.** This theme identified that crime was a general problem for Kingston-Galloway and certain at-risk neighbourhoods, however the article did not report a specific incident of crime. Any article that mentioned crime occurrences (e.g., stabbing, gunshot victim, police raid, etc.) while naming Kingston-Galloway as other neighbourhoods as having a ‘crime problem’ would be placed within this category. For example, mentioning Kingston-Galloway while referencing crime in another part of the city.

**Arts/Culture.** This category includes articles that discuss neighbourhood art shows, museums, festivals and/or performances that take place in Kingston-Galloway. Articles that mention programs that would be implemented in the neighbourhood that focus on these types of activities, however if the main focus of the article was on the specific program helping the community would be placed in the neighbourhood improvement category instead of the arts/culture category.

**Politics.** Any article that discussed a politician who was campaigning for votes, discussed their political platform and/or spoke to the residents of Kingston-Galloway was placed within this category. If a politician was speaking about recent criminal events,

and made reference to Kingston-Galloway in conjunction with implementing a social program, the article did not automatically fall within this category. Although if a politician was speaking of implementing legislation or social program as part of their election platform, then the article was placed into this category as the main focus of the article was political and not social welfare.

**Sports.** Any article that directly discussed sports or sporting achievements within Kingston-Galloway were placed within this category. For example, a high school basketball team winning a championship.

**Neighbourhood Stigma.** Any article that discussed the neighbourhood's negative reputation and acknowledgment of news/media perpetuating negative stereotypes was put in this category.

**Education.** Any article that discussed a school, school programming or student achievement at an academic event (e.g., international math contest, national spelling contests, etc.) was placed within this category.

**Non-crime social problems.** Any article that discussed other social problems that occurred in Kingston-Galloway or made reference to Kingston-Galloway was placed within this theme. For example, articles that discussed a lack of accessible public transportation, inadequate community centres etc.

### **Frame Analysis**

After conducting the thematic analysis, I engaged in frame analysis. Because I was concerned with the media's construction of Kingston-Galloway, frame analysis allowed for an examination of how the media framed the neighbourhood over the 14-year period of inquiry. Frame analysis allows for an examination of what reality is presented

while reports may neglect other perspectives, and as such it is ultimately a process that examines the power within text.

As Entman (1993) stated “[t]o frame is to *select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation* for the item described” (p. 52, emphasis in original). Framing, then, is a process whereby news sources explicitly state or omit pieces of information in a specific manner. This type of reporting aids in the creation of frames, or stated differently, frames offer an interpretation of cues that would otherwise be neutral (Kuypers, 2009, p. 182).

Frame analysis involves four components:

- (i) Defines a problem: determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values;
- (ii) Diagnoses causes: identify the forces creating the problem;
- (iii) Make moral judgments: evaluate causal agents and their effects; and,
- (iv) Suggest remedies: offer and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects (Entman, 1993, p.52).

Although all four elements help to clarify frames, they may not all be present in each article. As news reports, especially print media, have space/length restrictions, reports can span across the week. Therefore, the four elements may not be present in one article, however it may be present in multiple reports that span across the week on the same issue. Consequently, this allows for a longitudinal analysis to examine how the media frames issues – or in this instance, a neighbourhood – across time.

All 95 articles from my sample (71 from the *Toronto Star* and 24 from the *Toronto Sun*) were included in my qualitative analysis, which enabled me to

examine the manner in which local media frames Kingston-Galloway. This type of analysis ensured that I was able to examine in depth the themes that arose within my thematic analysis; my findings illustrate that in many articles more than one frame emerged.

Frame analysis is particularly cohesive with the moral panic framework as “frames select and call attention to particular aspects of the reality described, which logically means that frames simultaneously direct attention away from other aspects” (Entman, 1993, p. 54). Moral panic theory asserts that moral panics arise due to various media reports presenting opposing perspectives on an issue that threaten the moral fabric of society. Thus, my method of analysis does not solely provide an investigation of how local print newspapers of opposing political leanings frame a priority neighbourhood, but also examines the viability of my amended moral panic framework to account for fear of an entire neighbourhood.

### **Summary**

The current study employs a qualitative approach, which begins with a thematic description of the frequency with which each newspaper reported stories about Kingston-Galloway and examined the types of news stories put forth across the 14-year time period. I then conduct a frame analysis to examine how these two newspapers of opposing political leanings frame Kingston-Galloway. The results of the study are presented in Chapter Five.

## Chapter 5: Results

My research examines how Toronto's local print media framed Kingston-Galloway over a 14-year period (1998-2012). I am interested in whether local newspapers frame the neighbourhood in a manner that aids in the production of a moral panic, or fear of a geographical place. The thematic analysis illustrates that there is an influx of reporting on stories related to Kingston-Galloway during years that experience an increase in crime and violence, as well as in the year following the designation of Kingston-Galloway as a priority neighbourhood.

My analysis demonstrates that three prominent frames arise. The first frame was *Racializing Crime*. News reports typically discussed street level and violent gun related offences as a problem associated with racialized groups. The second frame was *Criminalizing Place*. This frame presented crime as a problem in *certain* neighbourhoods. Reports tended to affirm the notion that increased policing and social control measures were required in dealing with certain segments of the population. As expected, it is in this frame that the concept of insiders and outsiders were discussed in relation to place. And the third frame was a counter frame<sup>11</sup> that contested the two aforementioned dominant news frames. The counter frame, which I label *Community Mobilization*, suggested that community members needed to advocate and push for the programs and services that their communities need. This frame also captured those articles that suggested that neighbourhood residents cannot sit idly by and expect improvements without taking action themselves.

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<sup>11</sup> A counter frame is a frame that appears, however it is not as prevalent as the frame of focus. The counter frame discusses the opposing side of an issue, albeit less prominently as it may be less politically desirable (Chong & Druckman, 2012).

Community mobilization is consistent with the current neoliberal government that replaced the welfare state. Wacquant (2010) argued that the movement towards smaller government resulted in criminalizing the poor as a method of social control (e.g., incarceration) rather than social aid such as welfare programs or state-funded social programs. The post-welfare state will be discussed further in this chapter when the community mobilization findings are discussed.

This chapter presents the results of my findings. First, I present the descriptive statistics generated from the thematic analysis. I then present the three news frames in the frame analysis section. Accordingly, my results indicate support for my revised moral panic paradigm, insomuch as the media presents the neighbourhood in a manner that maintain and perpetuates fear amongst readers.

### **Thematic Analysis**

In Chapter 2, I argued that the racialization of crime, in conjunction with the criminalization of place can create a moral panic of a geographic location. As such, my thematic analysis examines the frequency in which articles about the neighbourhood are published as well as the types of articles published. I also examined whether the volume of news reports changed over time, however as I do not examine news reports of other neighbourhoods I cannot assert that these reports are more or less common in relation to Kingston-Galloway.

A total of 95 articles obtained from the *Toronto Star* and the *Toronto Sun* between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2012. Approximately 75% (71) of the 95 articles gathered were published in the *Toronto Star* while approximately 25% (24) articles were from the *Toronto Sun*.

**Table 2: Volume and Type of News Report in the Toronto Star (1998-2012)**

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total
Crime / Criminal Justice							1				6	3	1		3	14
Neighbourhood Improvement						1		5	5	9	7	1	2		10	40
Crime as a Social Ill								2					1	1	3	7
Arts/Culture												1		1	1	3
Politics													1	1	1	3
Sports												1		1		2
Neighbourhood Stigma													1		1	2
Education																0
Non-Crime Social Ill																0
<b>Total Articles</b>						1	1	7	5	9	13	6	6	4	19	71

Over the 14-year period of analysis, the *Toronto Star* published 40 articles (56.34%) about Kingston-Galloway related to neighbourhood improvement and 21 articles (29.5%) pertaining to crime/criminal justice and crime as a social ill. Contrary to what I anticipated finding, the *Toronto Star* reported more neighbourhood improvement issues than crime related news. Although neighbourhood improvement reports pertain to social services, programs, infrastructure and/or economic sustainability within the

neighbourhood, these articles did not portray the neighbourhood positively – as will be discussed in the qualitative section below. In fact, constant portrayals of a neighbourhood in need can result in what Purdy (2003) calls a ‘slum discourse.’ While the reports do not disproportionately report on crime related incidents, the consistent reporting of an area in need of improvement reinforces Sibley’s (1995) argument that politics create places of exclusion. That is that they do not receive the same attention as other areas of the city. Indeed, Kingston-Galloway lacks social services and programs that help create a "liveable" city (United Way of Greater Toronto, 2004). Narrow coverage of the neighbourhood reinforces the concept that inner suburban neighbourhoods are problem areas and contribute to the social exclusion affected groups and neighbourhoods experience.

By contrast, the *Toronto Sun* published 24 articles about Kingston-Galloway over the study period comprising 25% of my sample. Table 3 illustrates that the majority, 54.17% of all *Toronto Sun* articles published between 1998 and 2012 refer to crime/criminal justice issues in Kingston-Galloway. That number increased to almost 71% when crime as a social ill is added to the above total. Indeed, crime overwhelmingly characterizes the types of stories the *Toronto Sun* chose to publish.

Alternatively, less than 30% of all reports over the 14-year period demonstrated positive aspects of Kingston-Galloway. It is evident from Table 3 that coverage of the neighbourhood clustered around years where there was an increase in crime and/or programs or policies came into effect (2004, 2005, 2009, 2012), as was the case with the *Toronto Star*. Over the 14-year period, it is evident that the *Toronto Sun* presented Kingston-Galloway in a narrow manner that was predominantly focused on crime.

Although the *Toronto Sun*'s sample is small (24 articles total), there is little variance in the types of stories that it covered. In fact, Table 3 supports my claim that media disproportionately select stories that are negative and portray inner suburban neighbourhoods as criminalized places.

Two main conclusions can be drawn when comparing the *Toronto Star* and the *Toronto Sun*. First, the *Toronto Star* did not report any news that related to Kingston-Galloway between 1998-2002 (Table 2), whereas the *Toronto Sun* had three articles that mention crime/criminal justice and crime as a social ill in the same time period (Table 3). This finding illustrates the variance in reporting between papers with different political leanings. The *Toronto Star*'s focus was predominantly on neighbourhood improvement rather than crime in the area, which is contrasted with the *Toronto Sun*'s emphasis on crime reporting of inner suburban neighbourhoods (Table 2; Table 3).

The second conclusion is that the *Toronto Star* focused on neighbourhood improvement issues including social issues affecting Kingston-Galloway. Comparatively, the *Toronto Sun* primarily focused on crime-related stories across the 14-year timeframe. The difference between the types of stories covered in both papers, I suspect, can be contributed to their different political leanings and therefore prioritize different social issues.

The data presented from both papers indicate that the frequency of reports relating to Kingston-Galloway has increased over time. Both newspapers do not typically cover Kingston-Galloway until the early 2000's.

**Table 3: Volume and Type of News Report in the Toronto Sun (1998 – 2012)**

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	<b>Total</b>
Crime / Criminal Justice		2				1	3	1	2				1	1	2	<b>13</b>
Neighbourhood Improvement							1	1			1	1				<b>4</b>
Crime as a Social Ill					1			1				1			1	<b>4</b>
Arts/Culture												1				<b>1</b>
Politics																<b>0</b>
Sports																<b>0</b>
Neighbourhood Stigma																<b>0</b>
Education								1								<b>1</b>
Non-Crime Social Ill										1						<b>1</b>
<b>Total Articles</b>		<b>2</b>			<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>24</b>

My findings indicate that media coverage increased when there was an influx in crime or policy/program implementation that likely impacted the neighbourhood. Therefore highlighting the media's selective reporting of an inner suburban neighbourhood.

The following section presents my qualitative findings, specifically examining *how* the media has framed Kingston-Galloway over the 14-year period of analysis.

### **News Frames of Kingston-Galloway**

I conducted a frame analysis on the entire sample of articles published in the *Toronto Star* and *Toronto Sun* newspapers between 1998 and 2012. My analysis yielded two prominent frames in both the *newspapers*: (i) Racializing Crime and (ii) Criminalizing Place. In addition to these frames, I also found a third, counter frame that I labelled “Community Mobilization.” The counter frame was less prominently featured in articles compared with the two dominant frames. In fact, the counter frame was most prominent in articles that were composed by non-staff writers, such as a special article or editorial piece. There were however several articles written by staff that presented the counter frame, although these reports are published in the *Toronto Star* as part of a special series.

#### **i. The Racializing Crime Frame**

This frame was present in both the *Toronto Star* and the *Toronto Sun* in articles that reported crime incidents and neighbourhood improvement. Although both newspapers engaged in racializing crime, they each offered different moral judgement, which is discussed below.

**The problem.** Both papers suggested that Toronto’s violent crime was increasing in its inner suburban neighbourhoods. The reports singled out particular areas (e.g., Kingston-Galloway, Malvern and Rexdale) for increasing gun and gang violence in the city of Toronto. For example, “This has been one of Toronto’s worst shooting zones in recent years, the home and hunting grounds of several gangs” (Robertson, *Toronto Sun*, 2002, November 17, p. 37). The *Toronto Star* reporters also identified increased crime in 2005, “Despite Miller’s current get-tough stance on crime and his promise last week to

hire 150 new officers, critics say he has been slow off the mark during this wave of gun violence” (Lu, *Toronto Star*, 2005, August 16, p. A. 18). Both reports suggested that gun violence had been a problem in certain areas of the city. The first quote is from 2002 and characterized Scarborough as a ‘shooting zone’, even before the summer of the gun in 2005. Alternatively, the *Toronto Star* also asserted that there was an increase in gun crimes, however the reporters described it as a ‘wave’, which suggested that the increase in gun crimes was temporary.

The problem of increasing gun violence in specific inner suburban neighbourhoods was a persistent theme across the majority of the *Toronto Sun* articles. “On any given day, the piercing shriek of police sirens echo through Toronto’s neighbourhoods. In some it’s kind of background noise. Knife fights, robberies, gang violence, drug busts, gun fire, sexual assaults” (Artuso, Weese & Yeun, *Toronto Sun*, 2009, August 30, p. 4). Although news reports that named Kingston-Galloway were around years that experienced an increase in crime or a new policy initiative, reports that did mention crime suggested that crime and violence was a regular daily occurrence within inner suburban neighbourhoods.

Consistent with Henry and Bjornson (1999) and Wortley’s (2008) work, my research also found that the media associates street level crimes with Black communities. For example, “In the summer of 2005, gang violence erupted across the city, leaving a trail of victims, many of them young black [sic] men from poor neighbourhoods.... Much of the violence came from the areas identified in the report [Poverty by Postal Code by the United Way]” (Poisson & Dempsey, 2012, July 15, *Toronto Star*, p. A1). Moreover, reports of gun crime associated such behaviours with the actions of gangs. “Toronto

police are hoping they can reverse the tide of deadly gunfire by redeploying officers into troubled neighbourhoods and by targeting individual gangs” (Powell & Huffman, *Toronto Star*, 2005, September 20, p. B04). Although there was no direct mention of race in the article, it does note ‘troubled’ areas – and later reports discussed neighbourhood demographics of priority areas. Thus, the necessity to explicitly mention race is removed when replaced with more subtleties in the language use. These subtleties are more common in the *Toronto Star* than the *Toronto Sun*.

**The causes.** Depending on the newspaper, macro-level (i.e., social, political and/or economic structures) or micro-level (i.e., individual level) reasons for criminality were offered. Black men were presented as the reason for Toronto’s increasing crime problem, especially gang violence. The *Toronto Sun* discussed Black males’ involvement in gun-related offences, whereas the *Toronto Star* did not explicitly mention race. Instead, poverty and immigrant status was more likely to be cited as factors for increased involvement in crime. For example, “Significant visible minority population (72.9 per cent of population compared to 42.8 per cent in the city)... 65 per cent of residents are immigrants to Canada, compared to 49 per cent in the city” (n.a., 2007, April 10, *Toronto Star*, p. B1). Other articles illustrated that priority neighbourhoods experience the highest incarceration rates: “The people in jail come from our most troubled neighbourhoods. In Toronto, the high-incarceration areas [are] Regent Park, Kingston-Galloway, Jane-Finch and Jamestown” (N.a., 2008, July 19, *Toronto Star*, p. ID1). Conversely, the *Toronto Sun* explicitly noted race. “The main trouble comes mostly from young black [sic] men” (Robertson, *Toronto Sun*, 2002, November 17, p. 37).

**Moral judgements.** Both newspapers provided differing rationales for the causes of Toronto's violent crime to macro and micro level judgements of Black males. The *Toronto Sun* offered individual rationales for Black criminality. Black people were blamed for their own engagement in crime. Moreover, by 2012, the *Toronto Sun* began to historicize Black people's involvement in crime.

The Galloway Boys gang was formed in the 1980s by mostly Jamaican immigrants living in housing projects in Galloway Rd. At the time, such gangs were springing up in impoverished areas across the city as crack cocaine came to town... 'that was really the start of the street gangs in this city' (Doucette, *Toronto Sun*, 2012, September 16, p. 5).

This excerpt not only identified Jamaican criminal involvement of late but also provided a sequence of events to support their view that these men have a propensity for criminality. Framing issues in this manner serves to illustrate to the public a causal link between Black people and crime in an effort to strengthen the government's stance on a solution (i.e., social control). Therefore supporting risk management initiatives through the current post-welfare state.

Alternatively, although the *Toronto Star* associated visible minorities with gun and gang related offences, reporters noted macro-level causes for their criminal involvement. "Unless you tackle the root causes, all you do is take a bunch of people who are young offenders... and you push them into the prison system" (Powell & Rankin, *The Star*, 2005, December 31, p. E04). Three years later, the *Toronto Star's* reporters were still arguing that tackling crime required getting to the root causes of violence and crime. "Declining housing stock, business [sic] leaving the community, lack of services and not a lot of support for families and kids" (Baute, *Toronto Star*,

2008, May 22, p. A16). Therefore alluding to broader social forces that led to their marginalization and increased involvement in crime.

**Remedies.** The solution to curbing gang and gun violence in Toronto's inner suburban neighbourhoods offered by the media was to increase police presence and toughen gun and gang related legislation. The *Toronto Sun's* framing of the remedy was consistent across my 14-year time period.

The gang culture has taken hold here, Miller said. 'We want to get at it. We want to put the people involved in it in jail and get at the roots of it so it doesn't replicate itself.... 'The first message we have to send is if you use a gun in Toronto or have an illegal gun, you are going to jail' Miller said. 'The police are going to get into these gangs and they are going to arrest these people (Granatstein, *Toronto Sun*, 2005, August 16, p. 9).

The use of 'them' in the former Mayor's address indicates that 'they' are different from the rest of Torontonians and thus require social control as 'they' are responsible for crimes experienced in Toronto. Although race was not explicitly stated in the passage, the linkage of gangs and guns to Black males in Toronto was referenced in other articles and therefore does not require explicit expression. After implementing the priority neighbourhood strategy, the *Toronto Sun* reported that TAVIS made positive impacts on crime rates and that increased police presence was necessary to combat crime: "The police send in undercover officers to take out the worst offenders and flood the area with uniform officers to deter crime" (Artuso, Weese & Yuen, *Toronto Sun*, 2009, August 30, p. 4).

The above-mentioned quotes from the *Toronto Sun* illustrate the persistent portrayal of Black men as a major cause of Toronto's crime problem. The imagery of Black men as criminals has not changed in the *Toronto Sun* over time. This conservative

leaning aids the government's agenda for tough on crime approaches, despite evidence that such approaches are not effective.

The *Toronto Star* provided a different solution to the problem. In contrast to the *Toronto Sun's* solution, reports in the *Toronto Star* suggested tackling root causes of crime, which largely encompassed social programming. For example, "a broad community Safety Action Plan for communities at risk. It includes, in conjunction with Centennial College and the Toronto public school board, a training program for young people in the area" (n.a., *Toronto Star*, 2005, August 27, p. B05). Prior to 2005, the reports focused on social programs that would improve individual people. For example, "Newcomers have had a history of making enormous contributions to our country and our city' .... United Way funding will provide much-needed programs, particularly for youth, women and seniors, to help them adjust to life in Canada and contribute positively to our city" (Calleja, *Toronto Star*, 2003, December 8, B02).

After 2006, the framing of the remedy shifted from an individual focus towards a neighbourhood-centred focus of addressing increased levels of violence among Black men.

Federal and provincial data... indicates that GTA neighbourhoods with the highest levels of incarceration are those with lower incomes, higher unemployment, more single-family households and lower education. Despite the statistics, talk of tackling the root causes of crime is sometimes dismissed as being soft on criminals.... The country's incarceration rate is a political one (Contenta & Rankin, *Toronto Star*, 2008, July 26, p. A1).

The abovementioned quote is consistent with Wacquant's (2010) argument that the post-welfare state's focus is on criminalizing the poor, which serves a political purpose. Other reports discussed the need for people to have meaningful employment, education and community sporting programs to help deter them from criminal involvement.

By 2012, the *Toronto Star's* framing of Kingston-Galloway was still focused on macro-level approaches to combating crime. The frame however shifted to social programs losing funding and that the lack of social programs was contributing to the 'increase' in crime rates. For example,

Youth workers across the city echo his [Jam Johnson – 47 year old youth worker] outrage and stress that funding problems – not only a lack of it, but the sporadic way in which it is distributed – are undermining efforts to address systemic issues and keep young people from picking up guns (Dempsey, *Toronto Star*, 2012, July 18, p. A4).

Overall, crime was racialized in both newspapers. As Kingston-Galloway is predominantly comprised of racialized groups, I hypothesized that the neighbourhood would also be framed in a negative manner. The following section describes how the news media has criminalized Kingston-Galloway.

## ii. The Criminalizing Place Frame

The second prominent frame that emerged in both newspapers was 'criminalizing place.' News reports framed Kingston-Galloway as a geographic location that was constantly plagued with violence that required increased police attention. This consistent imagery presented the neighbourhood in a manner that could create fear of crime resulting in a fear of the neighbourhood as it was plagued with violence. Furthermore, consistent with the racializing crime frame, the *Toronto Star* and the *Toronto Sun* presented the neighbourhood in a manner that stereotyped the residents and place.

**The problem.** Consistent with the previous frame, crime was also racialized in this frame. As a result of the association of Black people with crime, the neighbourhoods or places in which high concentrations of Black people reside are likewise stigmatized. Stated differently, because Black people have been criminalized, neighbourhoods with

disproportionately large Black populations come to be labelled as problem areas because their residents are seen as such. “Sure, it’s just plain rough in some areas... [but] There are million-dollar houses, and some of the best streets in Toronto can be found south of Kingston Rd.” (Granatstein, *Toronto Sun*, 2007, January 14, p. C2). This quote illustrates the difference between various parts of Scarborough, and that the ‘nice’ places are where the million-dollar homes are, thus suggesting that any less is undesirable. The *Toronto Star* had similar portrayals, for example “For years, the area around Kingston and Galloway Rds. in Scarborough was plagued by the Galloway Boys gang as well as drugs and prostitution” (Aly, *Toronto Star*, 2006, August 4, p. B2). Thus, the explicit mention of years of drug and prostitution that had taken place in Kingston-Galloway portrayed the neighbourhood as overcome with crime. The abovementioned quotes illustrate that crime extended beyond groups, and onto the place they occupy.

**Diagnosing a cause.** Although the problem was the same in both frames, this frame presented the problem as having high concentrations of racialized groups, public housing, high school dropout rates and low-income single-parent families. This problem was an extension of the racializing crime frame to the extent that it encompassed macro-level factors for the cause of the problem. Kingston-Galloway houses a large immigrant population, “many of whom live in crowded private apartments, and hundreds of black [sic] long-time residents, many of whom live in government housing” (Dale, *Toronto Star*, 2010, January 16, p. IN1). As such, these demographics (i.e. immigrants, Black communities, government housing occupants) combine to create a landscape of exclusion (Sibley, 1995), that is, an outcast place (Cresswell, 2009). Reporters of the *Toronto Sun* presented the neighbourhood in a manner that also criminalized persons of lower socio-

economic classes along with those actually involved in crime: “This high-crime area near Morningside and Sheppard Aves. is half public housing, half full-rent tenants... Most [gang members], if not all have guns – of all sizes. Packing a pistol or having one in a car is a badge of power.... ‘It’s too dangerous here’” (Robertson, *Toronto Sun*, 2002, November 17, p. 37). The linkage between space, poverty, and violence are very clear.

**Moral judgment.** One of the judgments within this frame is attributed to the residents who occupy the neighbourhood, and labeling them as inherently different from the dominant group in society. High concentrations of non-Whites, poverty and low educational attainment all intersect to create a place that is different, which has been attributed to values and cultural beliefs that contrast with the White hegemony. The *Toronto Sun* provided cultural reasons for Black criminality, suggesting that “They [Blacks] rarely work, rarely get up before midday spending their days and nights with their babies’ mothers, with pals, often driving around, looking the look, walking the walk, talking the talk” (Robertson, *Toronto Sun*, 2002, November 17, p. 37). As Black people make up a disproportionate percentage of the residents in Kingston Galloway, these claims extend onto the entire area, marking it as vastly different from more affluent places.

Reports from the *Toronto Star* cited macro-level characteristics that contributed to the increased levels of crime experienced by the neighbourhood. Place is criminalized due to the socio-demographic makeup and thus garners increased police attention, which in turn resulted in higher incarceration of residents due to their postal code.

Common to the neighbourhood and others the Star analysis of jail data shows high incarceration costs are factors that go hand-in-hand with poverty higher levels of unemployment, more families heads by single moms, fewer university degrees, above-average numbers of public housing units, lower incomes.... It’s no surprise

these communities send a disproportionate number of people to jail” (n.a., *Toronto Star*, 2008, July 19, p. ID1).

The *Toronto Star* argued that residents from Kingston-Galloway were incarcerated at a rate that was disproportionate to other areas. Therefore, Kingston-Galloway received increased police attention.

Both newspapers offered different perspectives as to why the neighbourhood was criminalized. The *Toronto Sun* provided individualistic rationales, such as non-Whites having a culture of violence that predisposed them to criminal involvement. Reports from the *Toronto Star* suggested the barriers for inclusion lie within macro-level social structures. In accordance with place literature (see Chapter 2), landscapes can be used for political gain and therefore landscapes of exclusion aim to serve government agendas. This is done, by barring certain groups from full social, political and economic participation in society and subsequently from particular places.

The neighbourhood is also isolated, cut off on the west from downtown by a bridge passing over the train tracks – the same tracks that separate it from Guildwood Village, an enclave of single-family homes with manicured lawns and mature trees. Kingston-Galloway is literally on the wrong side of the tracks (n.a., *Toronto Star*, 2008, July 19, p. ID1).

Kingston-Galloway is a neighbourhood that experiences social isolation as there is only one bus that has a route through the neighbourhood.

The last judgement that was placed on the neighbourhood was that the neighbourhood was different inasmuch as it had increased gang and gun violence that was a normative characteristic of the area. The *Toronto Sun* reporters consistently referenced gun violence and gang violence within the neighbourhood as “background noise”, meaning that the residents were used to the criminal activity that took place or were even accepting of the violence. Accordingly, guns and gangs came to characterize

the place and as such that behaviour was perceived to occur ‘in place’, meaning these activities were no longer ‘out of place’, as it was in other more affluent places in Toronto.

Reports suggested:

On any given day, the piercing shriek of police sirens echo through Toronto’s neighbourhoods. In some, it’s background noise.... Toronto Police crime statistics show the overall number of major crime charges are up in 13 of the city’s most troubled neighbourhoods (Artuso, Weese & Yuen, *Toronto Sun*, 2009, August 30, p. 4).

**Remedies.** Consistent with the racializing crime frame, the *Toronto Sun* posited social control was a means to tackle the ‘troubled’ neighbourhood. Proposed tactics included increased policing, mandatory minimum sentences for gun and gang-related offences. “The gang culture has taken hold here,” Miller said. “We want to get at it. We want to put the people involved in it in jail and get at the roots of it so it doesn’t replicate itself” (Granatstein, *Toronto Sun*, 2005, August 16, p. 9). This quote suggested that getting at the “roots” of gang related offences means incarcerating people – suggesting this was where funding should be prioritized. Such a claim neglects that the roots of violence extend beyond individuals and is a result of broader social structures (i.e., employment opportunities, educational attainment, access to social and cultural services etc.). The solution, as presented by the *Toronto Sun*, suggested an easy solution: more police in the neighbourhoods that experience disproportionate rates of violence will result in lower crime rates in those places.

‘Since we’ve been in that area – there’s only been one shooting,’ Pearson said. ‘It’s made a huge improvement and the community members are ... meeting the officers, they’re shaking their hands, they’re thanking them for being there.... If we can stay in an area long enough, and that area can be made stronger, it’ll repel the violence from coming back’ (Artuso, Weese & Yeun, *Toronto Sun*, 2009, August 30, p. 4).

However, the claim that more police in neighbourhoods will yield long-term results is contradictory to empirical evidence that suggests police raids and ‘hot spot’ policing are ineffective in the long-term (Sherman & Eck, 2002). Moreover, these types of policing tactics typically result in an increased distrust of police from residents. Therefore this simplistic solution provided by the *Toronto Sun* is not an accurate interpretation of the effects of concentrated policing measures.

The overall results from my analysis suggest that crime was once accepted as ‘normal’ characteristics within certain neighbourhoods in Toronto until 2005. After 2005, gun and gang violence purportedly extended beyond the boundaries of outcast places into affluent neighbourhoods where such activities were not tolerated. It was not until 2005 that the media and more importantly the government began to pay attention to crime in certain places. This is evidenced by the *Toronto Sun*’s reporting of priority neighbourhoods that have gunfire and police sirens as “background noise”.

Reports from the *Toronto Star* suggested that using the criminal justice system is a “lazy response to crime”. Indeed, the criminal justice system is ineffective in decreasing overall crime rates in neighbourhoods that experience disproportionate rates of crime. By targeting the root causes of crime and applying a macro-level approach to crime reduction it is suspected to yield long-term results. Providing social programming, meaningful employment and increasing educational attainment is a more cost-effective way to combat violence in certain neighbourhoods (Thompson, 2009).

There’s consensus among experts on the front-end reforms needed for safer communities. Reduce poverty and school dropout rates. Invest in comprehensive childhood development initiatives. Make housing affordable. Increase access to health care and rehabilitative programs. Reduce incarceration rates, partly through alternatives to jail, and direct savings to

neighbourhoods with a high number of offenders (Contenta & Rankin, *Toronto Star*, 2008, July 26, p. A1).

The above quote illustrates that it is macro-level structures that impact neighbourhood levels of violence, and it is not that one group has a proclivity to crime that increases their chances of criminal involvement.

This frame differed from the racializing frame, as the coverage in the *Toronto Sun* and the *Toronto Star* remained consistent across the period of analysis. That is, the *Toronto Sun* consistently presented the image that Kingston-Galloway was a place that was plagued with gun and gang-related violence, while also attributing the acts to Black communities. Beyond the attribution that Black people were to blame for these social ills, the reporters also presented the neighbourhood as inherently different from other neighbourhoods in Toronto. These reports thereby reinforced the notion that certain behaviours/acts were typical inside places of exclusion. Reports from the *Toronto Star* were also consistent across the same time period, however they presented the neighbourhood as ‘troubled’ due to the various social barriers residents faced. The reporting of the *Toronto Star* was more consistent with criminological and geography literature that argue macro-level structures impact certain groups propensity to engage in criminal behaviour. Overall, landscapes of exclusion serve as a stark reminder that certain groups are not afforded equal access to social, political and economic arenas that aid in lower levels of criminality.

### **Counter-Frame: Community Mobilization**

In addition to the two prominent frames, a third frame that I identified as a counter-frame arose, which I labeled ‘Community Mobilization’. The term ‘community mobilization’ is understood as a community (i.e., Black communities) taking action to

address specific problems, rather than passively allowing governments to make decisions for them. Certain groups (e.g., affluent Whites) do not have to mobilize their communities in the same manner to receive action; they hold power (e.g. the financial, political, and legal resources) that enables relevant changes to be made.

This frame was only present in the *Toronto Star*. This is not surprising given the *Toronto Star's* position on the remedies provided in both the racializing crime and criminalizing place frames – the government should tackle the root causes of crime. Moreover, the articles suggested that residents of priority neighbourhoods need to be united in their calls for action from the government to increase access to social programming, meaningful employment and transportation to the downtown core.

**Problem.** As with the previous two frames, the problem identified within this frame was the same, guns and gangs were an increasing problem in Toronto's inner suburban neighbourhoods. The problem here however, was presented in a manner that argued macro-level structures were to blame for the neighbourhood's crime problem.

**Diagnosing a cause.** The cause of the problem was presented as residents' acceptance of crime within their neighbourhood. Beyond a general acceptance of crime by residents, they were portrayed as having feelings of hopelessness. These reports argued that this was due to a consistent lack of government response to neighbourhood levels of violence within particular places. Although the articles that I analysed did not explicitly discuss hopelessness, it was implied. I was able to account for what the articles did not say, as frame analysis can account for what articles explicitly report but also what they neglect to state, as that is just as important as what is reported (Entman, 1992). Community programs “[derive] from building self-confidence and a sense of self-worth

in young people. And there's an added bonus if it also helps in small ways to combat violence and improve the quality of neighbourhoods where they live" (Hepburn, *Toronto Star*, 2008, November 13, p. AA4).

**Moral judgement.** Toronto's priority neighbourhoods have high concentrations of single-parent households, low educational attainment and increased poverty levels, which all can contribute to increased levels of crime within a neighbourhood. Some articles did explicitly note the concentration of poverty and demographic characteristics of these neighbourhoods, however, what was not stated was that the residents might not passively sit by and accept violence. Instead, their socio-economic position in society may not afford them the time and capital to mobilize.

**Remedies.** Consistent with the current neoliberal state, reports called for communities to mobilize and take control of their neighbourhoods, rather than relying on police to tackle its crime-related issues. "Residents themselves need to mobilize and vocalize – spreading the message that they want a safe community" (Powell & Rankin, *Toronto Star*, 2005, December 31, p. E04). Reports also made call for actions, stating that residents cannot allow police to tackle crime but rather they are to take an active role in their own protection.

"(The audit) is an opportunity for the community to come together to voice their concerns and to look for solutions.... 'We can't just rely on a group of men and women in uniform to do the job for us. We have a responsibility, as well, as members of a community to ensure that our community stays safe'" (Aly, *Toronto Star*, 2006, August 4, p. B2).

This type of language is consistent with Goddard's (2012) notion of responsabilization, where individuals and communities are responsible for their own safety. In the current post-welfare state, government downloads the responsibility of risk management to

community led initiatives to assess the risks of individuals. Therefore, community mobilization in this sense can also be understood as responsabilization.

Residents of Kingston-Galloway have, however, volunteered their time to tackling their neighbourhood's crime problems. "Yesterday a different kind of gang, this one armed with pencils and surveys, set off from Morningside Mall to assess the safety of their community and how lighting, signs and other features might make it safer" (Aly, *Toronto Star*, 2006, August 4, p. B2). Reports also argued that it was not a matter of simply mobilizing the community, but rather "how to mobilize to get them [i.e social programming]" (Monsebraaten, *Toronto Star*, 2007, April 11, p. B7). Mobilizing communities serves two purposes, first it helps residents obtain their needs collectively and second it strengthens the sense of community within the neighbourhood:

As a result of community requests for more youth programs, the centre, which was primarily geared to serving seniors, has introduced martial arts classes and a youth drop-in. And plans are underway to designate a permanent space in the centre that youth can call their own. 'The recreation centre is now doing more with more people – not because their budget got dramatically increased, but because they got to know more people in the community,' says Sean Meagher, project manager for the area's Action for Neighbourhood Change initiative. It's what Meagher and others on the social service frontlines call "community engagement" or "community empowerment." That's connecting residents to each other and to the services in their midst. It's also about residents identifying the services they need and learning how to mobilize to get them (Monsebraaten, *Toronto Star*, 2007, April 11, p. B7).

Although this frame was not present in the majority of articles, it was still essential to consider it as it had important implications on how Kingston-Galloway had been framed within Toronto newspapers. This frame presented the neighbourhood in a manner that suggested that despite the socio-economic exclusion faced by residents of certain neighbourhoods, it should not preclude them from voicing their concerns, moreover

fighting for safer communities. Second, it presented residents of at risk neighbourhoods in a powerful light. It demonstrated to the public that they did have a voice, and their community's needs mattered.

### **Summary**

Findings for the thematic analysis illustrated that the *Toronto Star* highlighted reports of neighbourhood improvement more than crime-related stories. These findings were in contrast to the *Toronto Sun's* reports that predominantly focused on crime-related news across the 14-year period of analysis.

The results of my frame analysis suggested that news reports were consistently framed in a manner that racialized crime and criminalized place. A third frame was presented that contrasted the negative imagery presented of the neighbourhood and its residents. The community mobilization frame presented the residents in a way that illustrated how powerful they can be. In the following chapter I provide an analysis of my results and its implications for my moral panic framework.

## Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion

The overall aim of this study was to examine how local news coverage portrayed Kingston-Galloway and its residents between 1998 and 2012. Specifically, to determine how the Toronto print media might play a role in the racialization of crime and the criminalization of place in a manner that created a moral panic of a neighbourhood. My findings indicate that the imagery of both race and place is dependent upon the political leaning of the newspaper. As I predicted, the *Toronto Star* took a liberal perspective in its portrayals of racialized groups as well as the neighbourhoods in which they constitute the majority of the population. The imagery presented also coincided with the causes and remedies of the issues presented in each frame. The *Toronto Star* was also more likely to offer macro approaches to solutions of crimes and discredit the government's tough on crime approach. Conversely, as predicted, the *Toronto Sun* presented its reports in a manner that explained crime in a micro level approach that was consistent with the Conservative government's stance on crime issues. The reports proposed linkages between race and crime, oftentimes blaming Black men for all social ills relating to crime in Toronto. Moreover, entire places were criminalized as the reports focused disproportionately on crimes within inner suburban neighbourhoods and blamed its residents for Toronto's 'increasing' crime problem.

In line with the micro level causes put forth in both news frames by the *Toronto Sun*, the solutions were offered in a simplistic manner, such as putting 'them' in jail. The overly simplistic response to crime suggests that certain groups and places are criminal and thus need to be controlled (Waquant, 2010). Providing this simplistic response to crime reinforces the perception that certain social groups and neighbourhoods themselves

are the source of gun and gang-related offenses and as such, removing them from the public will solve society's crime problem (rather than examining the broader social and structural causes of such crime). This position also implies that both racialized groups and some inner suburban neighbourhoods should be feared.

As indicated previously, there is an escalation in reporting around periods of increased crime or related social program/policy implementation. My findings demonstrated that Kingston-Galloway was not consistently present in the news reports across the 14 year time period, but rather was mentioned during periods that it was affected by crime or legislation targeting the neighbourhood. In fact, in 2005, Toronto experienced 78 murders, 52 of which were gun-related homicides and the majority of those victims were young Black men (Siciliano, 2010, p. 2). News reports of Kingston-Galloway also increased in 2005, especially in the *Toronto Star* (see Table 2). Although there was an increase in crime, the most prominent article themes were neighbourhood improvement and crime as a social ill, however there were no articles that explicitly discussed gun-related crime in Kingston-Galloway, despite Toronto's increase in gun-related offences.

Alternatively, the *Toronto Sun* published three articles in 2004 that were related to crime/criminal justice issues. This was not surprising as the Toronto Police Service carried out a major gang raid (Project Pathfinder) in Kingston-Galloway that targeted the Galloway Boys – the largest gang in the neighbourhood and, supposedly the most deadly gang in Toronto at that time. As such, news coverage of this topic was common. In 2005, four articles mention Kingston-Galloway (Table 3). It is noteworthy that only one article was directly concerned with crime/criminal justice issues, however 50% of the

articles from 2005 discussed crime/criminal justice and crime as a social ill, indicating crime received half of all news coverage that year.

In 2006, Kingston-Galloway was identified as a priority neighbourhood (Low, personal communication, September 12, 2014), however in 2007, the *Toronto Star* published more articles relating to Kingston-Galloway than in 2006. All of the articles published in 2007 were categorized as neighbourhood improvement, which is no different than 2006 where all articles published related to neighbourhood improvement. It was the amount of articles published that differed between the years 2006 and 2007 that is of importance however. One potential rationale that more articles were published in 2007 than 2006 is that the neighbourhood received more funds and programs were being implemented during that period. Another reason for the difference is that the *Toronto Star* was also reporting some of the successes of these programs in their early stages. This reporting differed from 2006 where articles called for action and presented programs that were being implemented in the neighbourhood. In 2007, the focus was on the successfulness of programs in the short amount of time.

In 2007, Toronto experienced gun-related deaths at a rate that surpassed that of 2005, however the *Toronto Sun* only published one article that named Kingston-Galloway. The lack of news coverage in 2007 may be in part due to the fact that gun-related homicide did not occur in the neighbourhood and therefore the *Toronto Sun* did not mention Kingston-Galloway when they reported on crime in other parts of Toronto.

News coverage of Kingston-Galloway increased to 13 articles in 2008. In 2008, Bill C-2 *Tackling Violent Crime Act* took effect on May 1, 2008 under the Conservative

government. The *Tackling Violent Crime Act* toughened sentences for gun crimes by increasing mandatory minimum sentences for gun-related offences as well as some drug crimes (Contenta, Rankin, Powell & Winsa, *Toronto Star*, 2008 July 19; Canadian Bar Association, 2007). This legislation disproportionately targeted certain groups of people, largely socioeconomically disenfranchised groups. Therefore the enforcement of this legislation may have in part contributed to the increased reporting related to Kingston-Galloway. The reports not only related to crime, but also criminal justice related issues, which included increased policing in high-crime neighbourhoods. As expected, implementation of legislation that was intended for at-risk groups and that will potentially increase the prison population, will in turn garner the attention of media outlets and subsequently increase reporting, which is evident in my quantitative findings. ]

Kingston-Galloway again received increased news coverage in 2012, when 19 articles in the *Toronto Star* mentioned the neighbourhood. It was during the summer of 2012 that the Danzig Street shooting occurred (Danzig Street is within a kilometer of the Kingston-Galloway intersection). Therefore, Kingston-Galloway received increased coverage in 2012 due to its close proximity to a crime-related event. The majority of news reports in 2012 that appeared in the *Toronto Star* were related to neighbourhood improvement, compared to 32% of reports that covered crime/criminal justice and crime as a social ill, despite the areas recent events.

As discussed in Chapter 5, Kingston-Galloway was framed in a narrow manner. The first frame was racializing crime, which illustrated the residents as involved in criminal activities. Crime reports discussed Black people as the root of the crime problem, and moreover that they had a supposed culture of violence. The second frame

was criminalizing place. Both newspapers, albeit to a different extent, portrayed the crime in the neighbourhood as extending from the individual onto the area, therefore labelling the neighbourhood as a 'plagued' with violence. The third frame was a counter-frame, community mobilization. In the frame of community mobilization, residents were told not to wait for government responses to social issues, but instead to advocate for their needs, for example, community programs. Community mobilization is consistent with the current neoliberal state that that resulted in smaller government. In accordance with smaller government, citizens are expected to take responsibility for their overall safety, what Goddard (2012) describes as "responsibilization". There has been a shift towards community programs that target at-risk groups to proactively manage and mitigate risk (Goddard, 2012). Consequently, it is no longer government that is assessing the "risk" of certain groups, but dispersed across community programs. Although this presented an alternate to the typical reports of Kingston-Galloway, they were only present in the *Toronto Star's* special series or in opinion pieces.

Although I am unable to account for individual levels of fear in my study, my theoretical framework suggests that media and other social actors can impact levels of fear. Consistent with the moral panic framework, the years that Toronto experienced increased crime or policies/programs that were deployed or targeted at specific neighbourhoods, news reporting increased (Table 2; Table 3). Increased attention of an issue within media reports support Cohen's (1972) argument that media aid in creating a moral panic. The general public obtain most of their information pertaining to certain issues from new media (Henry & Bjornson, 1999; Dowler et al., 2006). As a result, the manner in which news reports are framed can significantly impact how the public

perceive certain groups of people, which can also extent to a geographic place (Weitzer & Kubrin, 2004; Heath, 1984; Bjornstrom et al., 2010). As such, the consistent negative portrayal of race and place in the *Toronto Star* and the *Toronto Sun* aided in constructing Kingston-Galloway as an outcast place and may impact fear of crime anywhere on my revised moral panic spectrum.

### **Strengths and Weaknesses of the Current Study**

**Strengths of my study.** Although my aim was to provide the strongest approach to examine how Toronto's local print media frame Kingston-Galloway between 1998 and 2012, there are limitations to my study. I begin my presenting my study's strengths. My thesis provides compelling evidence to suggest that the racialization of crime and the criminalization of place by the media can contribute to a moral panic relating to a geographic location.

The second strength is the time period that I examined, 1998-2012. Over a 14-year period I was able to examine the change in the political stance of two newspapers in Toronto experienced, as well as specific high-crime periods (i.e., 2005, 2007 and 2012). In addition to the time period examined, I analysed all articles that contained "Kingston-Galloway" that was generated from the two newspapers under investigation utilizing a rich qualitative methodology. By doing so, I provide a robust analysis.

**Weaknesses of my study.** Despite its strengths, there are certain limitations to the study. First, due to time constraints, the analysis focused on two local newspapers, the *Toronto Star* and the *Toronto Sun*. While previous research demonstrated that local news media is more impactful on audience levels of fear of crime (Weitzer & Kubrin,

2004), national news coverage tends to report on stories that garner national attention. Therefore any reference to “Kingston-Galloway” in a national paper could indicate a potential national response to the issue at hand (i.e. government policy to address gun violence).

I have not included from my analysis, smaller newspapers, including those from the ethnic press that may have a different stance on the issues at hand (but which are less likely to create wide-spread fear of crime or garner the attention of policy makers). For example, these newspapers may have provided different framing of Kingston-Galloway that is more in line with the residents’ perspectives of their neighbourhood and issues pertaining to it.

Moreover, as the focus of my thesis is on one of 13 priority neighbourhoods in Toronto, my findings are not generalizable to other Toronto neighbourhoods. Therefore I suggest that future research should examine other priority neighbourhoods to test the revised moral panic theory I put forth in Chapter 3.

Finally, my study does not directly test individual levels of fear of crime that resulted from the news media reports. While I constructed my study around local newspapers, as they are more impactful on fear of crime (Weitzer & Kubrin, 2004; Heath, 1984), I was unable to study the impact of how news is framed on consumers directly. Nonetheless, I argued that the media influences a spectrum of fear when framing neighbourhoods, as I cannot state with certainty the fear evoked within the public from newspapers. The aforementioned weaknesses provide directions for future research.

### **Directions for Future Research**

Researchers should extend beyond major local newspapers to examine both national newspapers and the smaller ethnic newspapers. The latter are important because they are typically not owned or edited by White elites, and thus could provide a counter to the dominant discourse. Further, researchers should examine other neighbourhoods to contrast more than one neighbourhood within Toronto. This will allow my revised theory to be tested, but also to ensure my findings are generalizable. Additionally, as Toronto is one of the most ethnically diverse cities in the world, analysis of a number of different racial groups in Toronto would be beneficial. This would provide an examination of how different ethno racial groups are portrayed in the media.

Future Canadian studies should also directly test the impact of media reporting on audience levels of fear of crime, and any implications this has for beliefs about neighbourhoods. This would provide useful in testing my extended moral panic framework, the third suggested area of future research.

### **Policy Implications**

As media reporting increases after high profile criminal events, criminal justice and government policy makers should consider crime trends over time before developing and implementing criminal justice policy to ensure they are responding to real crime problems and not sensationalized events. Given the ineffectiveness of many criminal justice approaches to reducing street crime and violence, future efforts may be directed at community and social service organizations so that they can address the suspected root causes of criminal behaviour. This may prove more cost-effective than traditional tough on crime approaches.

The media's role is not to be unbiased in its reporting of news, as they are a corporation aimed at increasing its profits. This is evidenced by the shift towards 24-hour news cycles to ensure consumers are engaged with their product. The biased reporting however can result in certain groups obtaining coverage of their issues, while neglecting the most marginalized (Peelo et al., 2004). Distorted perceptions of neighbourhood and residents may in fact enforce police and government decision-making. For example, if a neighbourhood is consistently in the news and is being framed negatively, the area and its residents may garner increased police attention. As such, news media should represent stories of race, place and crime in an unbiased manner as negative reporting can have real life implications on already marginalized groups in society.

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